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A UNIFYING THEORY OF TRIBAL CIVIL 
JURISDICTION 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher* 
ABSTRACT 
Two theories of tribal government authority under federal 
Indian law-territory-based authority and consent-based 
authority-are at war. No theory is acceptable to either tribal 
governance advocates or their opponents. The war plays out 
most dramatically in conflicts over tribal authority over 
nonmembers. 
The Supreme Court's own precedents on whether tribes 
may exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal 
lands are in deep conflict. Ironically, while the Court has 
expressed serious concerns about the ability of tribes to 
guarantee fundamental fairness to nonmembers in general, 
the Court's common law procedure for analyzing tribal 
jurisdiction makes irrelevant any evidence regarding the 
success or failure of tribal procedural guarantees. 
I propose a two-part common law test that first 
acknowledges a presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction on 
tribal lands, where tribal authority is at its apex. The 
presumption, however, may be rebutted in federal or state 
court by nonmembers challenging jurisdiction, allowing the 
parties to litigate whether the tribe has actually protected 
nonmember rights to fundamental fairness. This proposal 
unifies the territorial and consensual theories, and brings 
much needed realism to tribal jurisdictional questions. 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; Director, Indigenous Law 
and Policy Center. Reporter, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TIIE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
(American Law Institute). Appellate judge, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians, Hoopa Valley Tribe, Lower Elwha S'Klallam Tribe, Nottawaseppi Huron Band of 
Potawatomi Indians, Poarch Band of Creek Indians, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, 
and Santee Sioux Tribe. Thanks to Kristen Carpenter, Seth Davis, Gene Fidell, Kate Fort, 
Angela Riley, Wenona Singel, Joe Singer, Alex Skibine, and Rob Williams, and to the 
participants at Iowa and Arizona State law faculty workshops. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important and defining controversies of federal Indian 
law is whether American Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. The answer is embedded in federal common law, and the 
Supreme Court appears to be leaning toward the negative, 1 despite numerous 
lower court decisions from lower courts affirming tribal authority on Indian 
owned and controlled lands. 2 The Supreme Court's decision-making, by its 
own admission, is piecemeal in these cases, and too often turns on vague 
assumptions about tribal governance. The jurisprudence has evolved 
backwards, with the hardest cases coming first, leading to skewed results 
even in easy cases. Indian tribes exercising jurisdiction over nonmembers 
residing on or doing business on tribal lands, the last major area where the 
Supreme Court has yet to rule definitely, do so with considerable uncertainty. 
The Court has already decided cases involving the weakest aspects of 
modern tribal sovereignty, such as criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, 3 
civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonconsenting nonmembers on non-tribal 
lands,4 civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over state law enforcement officers, 5 
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over subject matters preempted by federal 
statute,6 and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonconsenting nonmembers 
l. See PhilipP. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 431, 457-60 (2005). 
2. Lower courts have found tribal jurisdiction in several cases, usually arising on tribal 
lands. E.g., DolgenCorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 
2014) (affirming tribal court jurisdiction over tribal member tort claim against another 
nonmember arising on tribal lands), reh 'g en bane denied, 746 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2014), petition 
for cert.jiled, Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians (U.S. June 12, 2014) (No. 
13-1496), available at https:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 14/06/dollar-general-cert-
petition.pdf; Call for the Views of Solicitor General (No. 13-496), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtordersll00614zor.pdf; Water Wheel Camp 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 820 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming tribal court 
jurisdiction over tribal suit to evict nonmember from tribal lands); Attorney's Process and 
Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 946 (8th Cir. 
20 10) (affirming tribal court jurisdiction over tribal trespass claim against nonmember arising on 
tribal lands), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011); Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coli., 434 F.3d 1127, 
1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (affirming tribal court jurisdiction over tort claim against 
nonmember arising on tribal lands), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1209 (2006); McDonald v. Means, 309 
F. 3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming tribal court jurisdiction over tribal member tort claims 
against nonmember arising on Bureau of Indian Affairs road); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
905 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming tribal jurisdiction to enforce tribal employment 
ordinance against nonmember businesses on non-triballand), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991). 
3. See Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978). 
4. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
5. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001). 
6. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 473 (1999). 
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in cases arising on non-triballands.7 In all such cases, the Supreme Court has 
said that Indian tribes may not exercise governmental authority over 
nonconsenting nonmembers. 
Tribal lands (that is, reservation lands8 or lands held in trust for Indian 
tribes by the Secretary of Interior9) are where tribal sovereignty is at its 
strongest. 10 If tribal authority over nonconsenting nonmembers is 
presumptive, a question the Supreme Court has expressly left open, 11 then 
tribal authority must be valid on tribal lands, or not at all. 12 
If confronted with a case in this area, the Supreme Court potentially would 
begin its analysis with a statement that there is a strong federal common law 
presumption that nonmembers are not subject to American Indian tribal civil 
jurisdiction and authority. Tribal interests may successfully overcome the 
7. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,438 (1997). 
8. E.g., Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 476 (1937) (tribal title to 
reservation lands confirmed by treaty); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights 
Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REv. 
1061, 1101 (2005) (noting that reservation lands usually acquired their status tlrrough the treaty 
process between tile United States and Indian tribes). 
9. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2014) (statute autllorizing Secretary oflnterior to acquire and hold 
land in trust for Indian tribes and individual Indians); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 
508 U.S. 114, 114 (1993) (trust land legally equivalent to reservation land). 
The statutory definition oflndian country, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2014), is only partially helpful 
in cabining this discussion because it includes lands outside of the scope of this discussion. Cf 
generally Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 520 (1998) (interpreting the "dependent 
Indian communities" portion of the statute narrowly). 
10. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-23 (1959); e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) ("[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of 
jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for 
taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within tile boundaries 
of the reservation, and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona .... lays to rest any 
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional 
consent."); Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country's Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the 
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595,606 (2010); Angela R. Riley, Indians 
and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1729-34 (2012); cf Carpenter, supra note 8, at 1088-89 
(analyzing theories of property rights for owners). 
ll. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 ("Our holding in tlris case is limited to tile 
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the 
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general."). 
12. Another potentially open question is whether Congress may legislate to recognize 
expansive tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, which it has done in relation to 
nonmember Indians. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. 101-511, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1856, 
1892 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1), (4) (2014)), and in relation to non-
Indian domestic violence offenders in limited circumstances, see Act of March 7, 2013, Pub. L. 
113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120-123 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2014)). While the Supreme 
Court affirmed Congress's power to reaffirm tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, doubts 
remained. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004),.id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
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presumption, but they have a difficult legal proof to make under this line of 
analysis. 13 The fact patterns, while just a snapshot of Indian country disputes 
involving nonmembers, demonstrate the high stakes at issue. Indian tribes 
struggle with governing nonmembers that pollute tribal lands and waters, 14 
allegedly cause deadly automobile and railroad accidents/5 accidentally 
cause far-ranging forest fires, 16 discriminate against Indian people in business 
financing, 17 and commit numerous criminal infractions over which tribes 
have no jurisdiction except through the issuance of civil citations. 18 The most 
recent high profile case, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians, now pending before the Supreme Court, involves a 
nonmember corporate employee who allegedly committed an act of sexual 
violence against a tribal member child working for the corporation under a 
tribal employment program. 19 
13. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 420, 420 (1997) (holding tribal court did 
not have civil adjudicatory authority over a tort claim between non-Indians on a state-controlled 
highway on the reservation); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 
U.S. 316, 316 (2008) (holding tribal court did not have civil adjudicatory authority over a contract 
and tort dispute involving non-Indian owned property on the reservation). 
14. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
921 (1998); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F. 3d 415, 419 (lOth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 965 (1997). 
15. See Nord v. Kelly, 520 F. 3d 848, 848 (8th Cir. 2008); Burlington N. R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 
196 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110, 1110 (2000). 
16. See Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1024 (2009). 
17. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Island Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
320 (2008). 
18. E.g., Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1008 (lOth Cir. 
2007). 
19. See DolgenCorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 
2014) (affirming tribal court jurisdiction over tribal member tort claim against another 
nonmember arising on tribal lands), reh 'g en bane denied, 746 F.3d 588, 588 (5th Cir. 2014), 
petition for cert. filed, Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians (No. 13 -1496), 
available at https:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 14/06/dollar-general-cert -petition. pdf, Call 
for the Views of Solicitor General (No. 13-496), available at 
http://www .supremecourt.gov/orders/courtordersll00614zor.pdf. The panel majority described 
the facts in greater detail: 
Dolgencorp operates a Dollar General store on the Choctaw reservation in 
Mississippi. The store sits on land held by the United States in trust for the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and operates pursuant to a lease 
agreement with the tribe and a business license issued by the tribe. At all 
relevant times, Dale Townsend was the store's manager. The tribe operates a 
job training program known as the Youth Opportunity Program ("YOP"), 
which attempts to place young tribe members in short-term, unpaid positions 
with local businesses for educational purposes. In the spring of 2003, 
Townsend, in his capacity as manager of the store, agreed to participate in the 
YOP. Pursuant to this program, John Doe, a thirteen-year-old tribe member, 
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Congress has never legislated broadly in this area, 20 leaving the Supreme 
Court, as a matter of federal common law, to define the metes and bounds of 
tribal sovereignty as it relates to nonmember defendants in civil casesY Since 
1981, when the Court announced the presumption against tribal jurisdiction 
in Montana v. United States, 22 its precedents indicate that the Court's thinking 
is strongly trending against tribal jurisdictionY However, the Supreme Court 
has not squarely addressed simple cases arising on tribal lands. The lower 
courts, likely as a result of the lack of clarity from the High Court, are 
struggling to deal with these cases. 24 
Scholarship roundly criticizes the Supreme Court for its restrictive views 
on tribal authority for the most part, but scholarly reform proposals usually 
recommend action by Congress to "fix" the field. 25 With few exceptions, 
was assigned to the Dollar General store. Doe alleges that Townsend sexually 
molested him while he was working at the Dollar General store. 
!d. at 168. 
20. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. 
REV. 121, 140-54 (2006) (canvassing modem era Congressional and Executive branch policy 
decisions in Indian affairs); cf Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196-206 
(1978) (reviewing Congressional statements and finding a "commonly shared presumption of 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power 
to try non-Indians"). 
21. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 457-58 ("Under foundational federal Indian law, Congress 
bore the responsibility of modifying the area in light of social evolution, unanticipated 
developments, or whatever else. Instead, in Oliphant and its progeny, the Court updated the field 
to reflect judicial perceptions of progressive legal norms without waiting for Congress to resolve 
the matter."). 
22. 450 U.S. 544, 553 (1981). 
23. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438, 438 (1997). 
24. See MacArthurv. SanJuan County, 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 934 (D. Utah 2005) ("The full 
extent of implicit divestiture has yet to be determined, resulting in no small amount of uncertainty 
and confusion as to the scope of tribes' inherent civil authority over non-Indians ... and leading 
to frequent litigation of that question in cases such as this one.") (citations omitted); Ho-Chunk 
Nation v. Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal Law 299, 305 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court 2000) (citing Laurie 
Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court 
Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, n.17 (1997)) (other footnotes omitted); cf In re Estate of Big 
Spring, 255 P.3d 121, 126 (Mont. 2011) ("While seemingly straightforward, our case law 
regarding civil jurisdiction over issues arising in Indian Country has not been a model of clarity 
and, as demonstrated in this case, has caused practitioners and courts great confusion as to the 
appropriate analysis to undertake in such circumstances."). 
2525. E.g., David A. Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 
1253, 1279-81 (2006) (proposing a Congressional act authorizing a federal cause of action to 
enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Economic 
Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REv. 759, 768 (2004) 
("Hicks fix"); R. Stephen McNeill, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposal to Incorporate Tribal 
Courts into the Federal Court System Without Compromising Their Unique Status as "Domestic 
Dependent Nations", 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 283, 310-17, 330-32 (2008) (proposing and 
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scholars often do not propose a detailed federal common law solution, instead 
opting to demonstrate the wrongness of the Court's decisions. 26 Scholarly 
thinking on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers focuses either on the 
implications of tribal membership and the ability to consent to tribal 
jurisdiction, or on the ownership status of the lands upon which these disputes 
arise. 27 The scholars talk past each other and no paper has merged the theories 
into a unified whole. 
I start with the view that both territory-based authority and membership-
based authority have a great deal of merit, and significant weaknesses. This 
paper attempts to identify and coalesce worthy principles ofboth theories into 
a unified and practical theory. I identify the various legal and policy 
justifications as to why tribal governments should or should not have civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers with an eye toward disputes arising on Indian 
lands. Since federal Indian law is one of only a few areas of federal law in 
which the federal judiciary can create federal common law (the other being 
analyzing various Congressional reform options); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between 
the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for 
the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 704--06 
(2009) (proposing and analyzing various Congressional reform options). But see, e.g., L. Scott 
Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Tribal Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 669, 685-92 (2003) (predicting the Supreme Court would strike down a "Hicks 
fix"). 
26. Law professors and Indian law practitioners spilled many of gallons of ink, usually 
stumbling over each other to criticize the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. More recent papers 
include, for example, Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's 
(Re)construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 623 (2011); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 45 (2012); Winter King, Eric Sheppard & Rob Roy 
Smith, Bridging the Divide: Water Wheel's New Tribal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 47 GONZ. L. REv. 
723, 723 (2011-2012); William P. Zuger, "Members Only": A Critique ofMontana v. United 
States, 87 N.D. L. REv. 1, 1 (2011). 
Exceptions include Grant Christenson, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court 
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: The Case of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
527, 527 (2010-2011); Katherine J. Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts' 
Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1555-64 (2013) (arguing in favor of a minimum contacts 
analysis); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1189-98 (2004) (proposing a doctrinal shift toward 
"experiential sovereignty"). 
27. Compare L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996) (favorably chronicling "the decline of land-based 
sovereignty, and the rise of sovereignty based upon consent"), with Allison M. Dussias, 
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme 
Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 6 (1993) (critically reviewing "the implications 
of the rejection of a geographically-based view of tribal sovereignty"). 
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admiralty law28), this paper attempts to speak directly to the federal judiciary 
and to the stakeholders in tribal civil jurisdiction disputes, in addition to the 
academy. I conclude, consistent with at least some statements of the Supreme 
Court and some lower courts, that tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers 
on Indian lands should be presumed unless the nonmember can prove under 
generally accepted principles of comity that jurisdiction should not be 
recognized. I recommend, however, that the presumption can be rebutted by 
an inquiry into whether the tribal government and/or tribal court provided 
adequate due process to the nonmember challenging its jurisdiction. 
I proceed in Part I with a description of the lay of the land in regards to 
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. I start with a brief history of tribal 
civil jurisdiction before covering several of the major Supreme Court cases 
that established the legal framework for the exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers, leading to a discussion about the competing theories of 
tribal jurisdiction. At the end of this section, I quickly describe the unusual 
procedural route-the so-called tribal court exhaustion doctrine-that the 
Supreme Court has articulated for tribal civil jurisdiction cases to travel 
before nonmembers may seek federal court review of assertions of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. 29 
In Part II, I collect and analyze the various theoretical justifications and 
objections to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers raised over the years 
by the Supreme Court, in the more recent cases in the lower courts, and by 
other observers. I conclude in the second subpart that the Supreme Court's 
expressed concerns about tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers are 
structural, in that the American Constitution does not bind Indian tribes, 30 and 
so the Court may be hesitant to recognize tribal jurisdiction in disputed cases. 
I will also collect and analyze additional policy objections raised by 
nonmembers in recent cases; for example, in addition to structural concerns, 
nonmembers are concerned about tribal authority over nonmember private 
property. I note additionally that certain substantive limitations in the tribal 
court exhaustion doctrine have unnecessarily obfuscated the real concerns 
facing tribes and nonmembers in these jurisdiction cases. 
In Part III, I offer a clean analytic structure for courts to apply when faced 
with nonmembers disputing tribal civil jurisdiction on tribal lands. First, the 
courts should presume, as the Supreme Court has in dicta numerous times, 
28. See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 
(2006) (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981) and Cnty. of 
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985)) (footnotes omitted). 
29. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 845 (1985); 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 9 (1987). 
30. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 376 (1896). 
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that tribes do have civil authority over nonmembers on tribal lands. I then 
recommend that federal and state courts confronted with a tribal civil 
jurisdiction case involving nonmembers arising on tribal lands inquire into 
the tribal government and/or tribal court process to assess whether that body 
guaranteed a fundamental fair decision-making process. I would tie that 
inquiry to the specific tribal process, rather than the general theoretical 
criticisms of tribal authority that courts and others assume apply to all tribes 
in all situations. 
In Part IV, I conclude by admitting that the federal common law on this 
question is all but set, and that my recommendations may fall upon deaf ears. 
However, I argue that tribal governments may successfully and legitimately 
exercise civil jurisdiction over many consenting (and even more than a few 
nonconsenting) nonmembers anyway, eventually undercutting the common 
law justifications for restricting tribal jurisdiction on tribal lands and setting 
the stage for the future overhaul of federal Indian common law. 
I. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS 
Tribal government assertion of civil regulatory and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers is a relatively new phenomenon. Until the 
1970s, when federal Indian policy shifted to tribal self-determination, many 
tribal governments had no power or wherewithal to exercise their power, nor 
were there many tribal judicial systems. 31 As a result, the first cases involving 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers did not reach the Supreme Court until 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.32 This Part quickly summarizes the history of 
this field and highlights the main doctrines at play. 
A. A Brief History of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
No discussion of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is complete 
without reference to Tom Schlosser's foundational paper, Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers. 33 Schlosser provides an excellent overview 
31. See generally DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 51-82 (3d ed. 2011) (surveying the 
development of tribal governments); NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N., INDIAN COURTS 
AND THE FuTURE (David H. Getches ed. 1978) (surveying tribal justice systems circa 1978). 
32. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S 191, 191 (1978) (criminal 
jurisdiction); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (civil jurisdiction). 
33. Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers, 37 TuLSA L. REv. 
573, 573 (200 1 ). More recently, Professor Sarah Krakoff published a critically important primer 
for judges on the lay of the land in tribal civil jurisdiction. See Sarah Krakoff, Tribal CivilJudicial 
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 1187, 1187 
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of the history of tribal assertions of jurisdiction prior to 1978, canvassing 
early cases about the authority of Indian tribes to assert civil jurisdiction, in 
particular taxation power, over both members and nonmembers.34 Schlosser 
demonstrated that Indian tribes occasionally asserted police powers over 
persons on reservation lands in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 35 
However, tribal assertion of power was unusual because in the nineteenth 
century, Congress and the Department of Interior presided over the break-up 
of many Indian reservations through the allotment processes put into place 
by Indian treaties36 and the General Allotment Act. 37 Allotment divided up 
the larger, communally owned reservations to individually owned parcels and 
opened up "surplus" reservation lands to public sale. 38 The resulting pattern 
ofland ownership generated a complicated "checkerboard" pattern of federal, 
state, and tribal jurisdiction that plagues much oflndian country even today. 39 
These land sales also introduced many nonmembers into the area formerly 
and formally understood to be Indian country. 40 Meanwhile, the federal 
government's late nineteenth-century bureaucracy began to intrude on the 
daily operations of many, if not most, Indian tribes,41 so much so that, by the 
(2010). Professor Krakoff picks up where Schlosser left off and parses through the most recent 
important lower court and Supreme Court cases since 1997. 
34. See Schlosser, supra note 33, at 574-77. 
35. See id. 
36. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN ThEA TIES: THE HISTORY OF APOLITICAL 
ANOMALY 241-42 (1994) (summarizing the allotment provisions contained in the Manypenny 
treaties negotiated and ratified in the 1850s). E.g., Treaty of Detroit, ll Stat. 621 (1855); 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE 
BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 62-69 (2012) (describing the implementation and 
effects of treaty allotment in certain Michigan Indian communities under the 1855 Treaty of 
Detroit). 
37. See generally D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 
(Francis Paul Prucha ed. 1973); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 
1 (1995). 
38. See Royster, supra note 37, at 10-15. 
39. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962); Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 
608 F.3d 1131, 1137 (lOth Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
40. E.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420-21 (1994) ("Of the original 2 million acres 
reserved for Indian occupation, approximately 400,000 were opened for non-Indian settlement in 
1905. Almost all of the non-Indians live on the opened lands. The current population of the area 
is approximately 85 percent non-Indian."). 
41. See C. Blue Clark, How Bad It Really Was Before World War II: Sovereignty, 23 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REv. 175, 175 (1998); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, SelfGovernance for 
Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1251, 1256-58 (1994) ("era 
of pupilage"). 
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1950s, federal bureaucrats purported to control even the bedtimes of some 
reservation Indians. 42 
In this political dynamic, it is no wonder the tribal governance structures 
collapsed. While some tribal communities maintained a working justice 
system and civil governance structure, such as the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma43 and perhaps the Navajo Nation, 44 tribal governance in most of 
Indian country was an informal and inefficient affair for many decades. 45 As 
former director of the Office American Studies for the Smithsonian Institute 
Wilcomb Washburn wrote, "Indian groups in 1934 were mere shadows of 
their former selves."46 In areas of Indian country where non-Indians owned 
most of the land and constituted a significant portion of the population, tribal 
governance as we see it now likely was latent. 
Additionally, many Indian tribes are relative newcomers to governance. 
The federal government has recognized the sovereignty of many hundreds of 
Indian tribes since 1934 when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization 
Act. 47 There are now 567 federally recognized Indian tribes. 48 In 1934, there 
were between 200 and 300 recognized tribes, and Congress legislatively 
terminated (but later restored) many of those tribes starting in the 1950s.49 
The vast majority of Indian tribes recognized since 1934 have a small, heavily 
checker-boarded land base, have small populations, are surrounded by non-
Indian land, and are outnumbered (sometimes overwhelmingly) by their non-
Indian neighbors. 50 Many numbers of tribes, as a result of all of this 
42. See Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950 1953: A Case Study in 
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 360 (1953) (quoting Hearings before Senate Appropriations 
Committee on Interior Department Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 840 (1952)). 
43. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND TilE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO 
COURT (1975). 
44. See MARY SHEPARDSON, NAVAJO WAYS IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN POLITICAL 
PROCESS (1963). 
45. See VINE DELORIA, JR., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS 
(Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 2002) (labeling 1890-1930 as the "time of the traditional govermnents"). 
46. Wilcomb E. Washburn, A Fifty-Year Perspective on the Indian Reorganization Act, 86 
AM. ANTIIROPOLOGIST 279, 279 (1984). 
47. Act ofJune 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amendedat25 U.S.C. 
§§ 461-463 (2014)). 
48. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 4748, 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014). 
49. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 
AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 139, 139 (1977). 
50. For example, the Department of Interior recognized three lower peninsula Michigan 
tribes-the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the Huron Nottawseppi Band 
of Potawatomi Indians, and the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians-
since 1980. Congress recognized three others-the Little Traverse Bay Bands ofOdawa Indians, 
the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. All six 
tribes suffered from "administrative termination" -a uniquely devastating breach of the federal-
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convulsive history, had limited resources and little political and legal 
infrastructure to exercise their police powers at the inception of their federal 
recognition. 
In the 1950s through the 1970s, though, established reservation 
communities began to reassert their police power throughout Indian country, 
inspired by the threat of Public Law 280, 51 the recognition of inherent tribal 
court jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, 52 and the dictates of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act. 53 The impetus for this increased tribal governance activity, 
ironically, was a federal statute purporting to undermine tribal governance, 
Public Law 280. That law extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction into 
Indian country in five (later six) states,54 and allowed other states to enact 
legislation to assert jurisdiction into Indian country voluntarily. 55 The Navajo 
Nation, for example, feared that the Arizona legislature would exact 
legislation to assert jurisdiction within the reservation, and so the Nation 
established its own court system to deter the state legislature's proposed 
action. 56 Second, in Williams v. Lee,57 the Supreme Court held that the Navajo 
Nation's judicial system had exclusive authority to adjudicate civil claims 
arising on the reservation against tribal members. 58 Congress' enactment of 
the so-called Indian Bill ofRights in 1968,59 along with the Supreme Court's 
holding in 1978 that federal rights enumerated in the Indian Bill of Rights 
may only be asserted in tribal forums, 60 compelled many tribes to develop 
tribal trust relationship. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, History, and Semantics: The 
Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REv. 487, 502-15 (2006). By the time Congress 
and Executive branch restored their tribal status, each of the six tribes were virtually landless and 
penniless. 
51. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2014)); see generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE 
GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (20 12). 
52. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217 (1959); see generally Dewi lone Ball, Williams 
v. Lee (1959)-50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One of the Most Important Cases in the 
Modern-Era ofFederallndian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 391, 391 (2010); Bethany R. Berger, 
Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1463 (2011). 
53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303; see generally THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 
(Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, and Angela R. Riley eds., 20 12). 
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2014) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2014) (civil). 
55. Congress amended Public Law 280 in 1968 to require tribal consent to assertions of 
state authority. See Act of Dec. 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-283, Title IV,§§ 401-402, 81 Stat. 752 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (2014)). 
56. See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION 
OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 25-29 (2009). 
57. 358 U.S. at 217 (1959). 
58. See id. at 221-22. 
59. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2014). 
60. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,59-70 (1978). 
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their own justice systems. 61 The federal government's dramatic shift toward 
supporting tribal self-determination in the 1970s helped as wel1. 62 Now there 
are over 300 tribal courts, and many more in development.63 
With federal backing, tribes began to exercise civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, leading to Montana v. United States, 64 which arose on non-
Indian owned fee lands located within the Crow Reservation. 65 While the 
primary doctrinal thrust of the Montana case involved a quiet title action to 
lands on the Big Horn River, 66 the Court also passed on the Crow Tribe's 
authority to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing activities on non-Indian 
owned land. 67 The Court held that tribal authority to regulate nonmember 
activities was presumptively invalid in the absence of consensual commercial 
activities and nonmember activity that significantly affected the welfare of 
the tribe. 68 The Crow Tribe's hunting and fishing regulations did not meet the 
exceptions because the Tribe had not been regulating the area before. 69 In 
short, the Court rejected an effort by an Indian tribe to restore tribal 
governance over an area of its reservation that had long been left to state and 
non-Indian control. Montana itself, while a defeat for tribal interests, was not 
all that surprising. But the defeated tribal regulation became a harbinger of 
future outcomes before the Supreme Court on tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. Since the late 1980s, the Court has not approved of tribal civil 
regulatory authority over nonmembers. 70 
61. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian 
Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 59, 63 (2013). 
62. See generally Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self Determination: An Overview, in 
INDIAN SELF-RULE 191 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986). 
63. A 2005 report on Indian courts noted that the Bureau of Justice Assistance had awarded 
grants to 294 Indian tribes for planning and enhancing their court systems. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 6 (2005), available at 
http:/ /law. und.edu/ _files/ docs/Ui/ docs/pathways-report. pdf. 
64. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
65. For an outstanding history of the Montana case, see JohnP. LaVelle, Beating a Path of 
Retreat from Treaty Rights and Tribal Sovereignty: The Story ofMontana v. United States, in 
INDIAN LAW STORIES 535 (Carole Goldberg, KevinK. Washburn, & PhilipP. Frickey eds., 2011). 
66. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-56. 
67. !d. at 557-68. 
68. !d. at 565-66. 
69. !d. at 566. 
70. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,440 
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (tribal zoning). Taxes, hunting, and fishing regulations are 
another matter. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1983) (affirming tribal 
authority to tax nonmembers on tribal lands); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 
199 (1985) (same); Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) 
(same); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983) (indirectly affirming 
tribal authority to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on tribal lands). 
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The law of tribal civil jurisdiction, a common law that has developed over 
decades in cases usually arising on non-Indian fee lands within fragmented 
reservations, stands in the way of what should be noncontroversial, even easy, 
cases. Since the courts and scholars focus on the common law history of cases 
relating to tribal civil jurisdiction, their reasoning is without the benefit of the 
knowledge of perhaps thousands of instances in American history where 
tribes successfully asserted civil jurisdiction over nonmembers without 
consent and without dispute. I would argue that even prior to the modem era 
of federal Indian law, Indian tribes routinely asserted civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers on tribal lands. 71 As one court wrote in 1900, Indian tribes 
controlled entrance onto Indian lands, and therefore could "impose 
conditions."72 
In the current era, thousands upon thousands of nonmembers consent to 
tribal jurisdiction as a matter of course; thousands, and perhaps hundreds of 
thousands, of nonmembers work for Indian tribes, live in tribal housing, 
receive direct tribal government services such as job training and health care, 
and engage in direct contractual relationships with Indian tribes. 73 As I have 
suggested elsewhere,74 the only cases federal courts see in the current era are 
outlier cases, where nonmembers engage in almost herculean (and 
occasionally offensive75 ) efforts to avoid fairly noncontroversial assertions of 
tribal jurisdiction. 
71. E.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905) ("The authority of the Creek 
Nation to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may transact business within its borders did 
not have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United States. It was one of the 
inherent and essential attributes of its original sovereignty."), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 
(1906); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 393 (1904) (holding that Congress authorized 
Chickasaw tribal taxation of nonmembers); Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426, 431-32 (8th Cir. 
1893) (implicitly recognizing tribal authority to tax nonmembers, with enforcement duties 
residing in the federal government, not federal court). 
72. Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807, 8-ll (Ind. Terr.), ajf'd, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900). 
73. About 3,600 people work at the Seneca Nation's casinos alone. See Tom Precious, 
Senecas Fear Job Loss Under Plan for Casinos, BUFF. NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www .buffalonews.com/article/20 110907 /CITY ANDREGION/309079905. Thousands 
more work at Foxwoods Resort Casino, owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Nation. See WILKINS 
& STARK, supra note 31, at 147. 
74. See Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 26, at lll. 
7 5. "Offensive" is a strong term, but I consider the actions of certain nonmember defendants 
in tribal courts that openly display arrogant hostility to tribal judges and opposing parties 
offensive. Consider the threatening commentary of the attorney in Bank of Hoven (Plains 
Commerce Bank) v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6006 (Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe App. Ct. 2004), available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 10/l2/bank-of-hoven-4.doc, where the court found 
counsel for the nonmember articulated "some kind of threat impugning the integrity of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's judicial system"; or the actions of the nonmember in Colorado 
River Indian Tribes v. Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc., No. 08-0003, at 6 (Colorado 
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Let us turn to the federal common law of tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. 
B. Federal Common Law of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
The modern Supreme Court has articulated a general rule that is skeptical 
of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on nonmember owned land 
within Indian country. In essence, there can be no tribal power absent one of 
two narrow exceptions, known colloquially as the Montana I and Montana 2 
exceptions. 76 The first exception, the consensual relations exception, allows 
for tribal jurisdiction where the nonmember has consented. 77 The Supreme 
Court has so far rejected all proposed interpretations of the exception 
benefitting tribal governance; for example, that the provision of general 
public safety services by an Indian tribe amounts to sufficient consent, 78 or 
that nonmember suits in tribal judicial system in different cases amounted to 
consent to a later suit against the nonmember. 79 Many nonmembers expressly 
consent contractually, rendering this the most important exception. Indian 
tribes around the nation probably employ, house, or otherwise administer 
government services for several hundred thousand nonmembers, all of whom 
have either expressly or implicitly consented to tribal jurisdiction. The second 
exception allows for tribal authority where the nonmember engages in 
activity that imperils the health, welfare, and political and economic security 
of an Indian tribe. 80 This is a much more difficult exception for Indian tribes 
to prove, despite the broad language, and typically requires nonmember 
actions that involve "catastrophic consequences."81 
The Supreme Court's application of the Montana general rule took a 
circuitous route. The first cases following Montana involving tribal authority 
over nonmembers barely mentioned Montana. In New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, 82 the State sued the Tribe seeking a judgment that it had 
concurrent jurisdiction over hunting and fishing regulation involving 
River Indian Tribes App. Ct. 2009), available at 
http:/ /sct.narf.org/documents/waterw heelvlarance/crit_ ct_ of_ appeals_ opinion. pdf, where the 
court found that counsel for the nonmember engaged "in the ultimate in chutzpah" in challenging 
the tribe's authority and the tribe's court system. 
76. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
77. See id. 
78. See Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
79. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 342 
(2008). 
80. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
81. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341 (quoting COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW§ 4.02[3][c], at 232 n. 220 (2005 ed.)). 
82. 462 U.S. 324, 324 (1983). 
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nonmembers on tribal lands. 83 The parties understood tribal governance 
interests on Indian lands to be so strong that the State conceded that the Tribe 
had authority to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on tribal lands. 84 
The Court agreed that Montana itself held that tribes may regulate 
nonmember hunting and fishing on tribal lands: "[A]s to 'lands belonging to 
the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe,' we 'readily 
agree[ d]' that a Tribe may 'prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing ... 
[or] condition their entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel 
limits. "'85 Similarly in the previous year, in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 86 the Court held that Indian tribes retain inherent authority to tax 
nonmember companies doing business on tribal landsY Prior to Montana, 
the Court had also held that tribes may tax on-reservation sales to 
nonmembers. 88 
The Court's first move away from presuming tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers on tribal lands came in Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 89 a 
case (like Montana) that involved the regulation of non-Indian lands on the 
reservation. 90 The tribal claim involved zoning and land use, a type of 
governmental regulation that is uniquely difficult to do on heavily 
checkerboarded reservations on the Yakima (now Yakama) Reservation. 91 
The Court, in a fractured decision, divided the Yakima Reservation into 
"open" and "closed" areas corresponding to the parts of the reservation that 
had been allotted ("open," with many residents being non-Indian) and largely 
not allotted ("closed," with most residents being Indians). 92 The Court, 
83. !d. at 329-30. 
84. !d. ("New Mexico concedes that on the reservation the Tribe exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting 
andjishing by nonmembers.") (emphasis added). 
85. !d. at 331 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 557-67). 
86. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
87. !d. at 140. 
88. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
176 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
89. 492 U.S. 408, 414 (1989). For more discussion of Brendale, see Joseph William Singer, 
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). 
90. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 414 (opinion of White, J.). 
91. According to Justice White, the court of appeals held that "a 'major goal' of zoning is 
coordinated land-use planning. Because fee land is located throughout the reservation in a 
checkerboard pattern, denying the Yakima Nation the right to zone fee land 'would destroy [its] 
capacity to engage in comprehensive planning, so fundamental to a zoning scheme."' !d. at 421 
(opinion of White, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima 
Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
92. !d. at 437 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("Most significantly, [the record] establishes that as 
early as 1954 the Tribe had divided its reservation into two parts, which the parties and the District 
Court consistently described as the 'closed area' and the 'open area,' and that it continues to 
maintain the closed area as a separate community."). 
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without a majority rule, held that Yakima County's efforts to zone the "open" 
area of the reservation "do[es] not imperil any interest of the Yakima nation," 
and allowed that area to be zoned by Yakima County. 93 However, a majority 
of the Court, over the objections of a minority that would have applied the 
Montana general rule, 94 affirmed the tribe's zoning rules in the "closed" area 
so long as it "[was] neutrally applied, [was] necessary to protect the welfare 
of the Tribe, and [did] not interfere with any significant state or county 
interest. "95 
The next important tribal civil jurisdiction case96 directly involved, for the 
first time, tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over a nonmember 
defendant-Strate v. A-1 Contractors. 97 The case involved an automobile 
accident on a state-controlled highway located on tribal trust lands, and a 
tribal court suit filed by the non-Indian plaintiff against a non-Indian 
defendant. 98 The nonmember defendant was driving on the reservation only 
because the tribe had engaged it to perform landscaping work on triballand. 99 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion first held that the state-controlled highway where 
the accident occurred was not tribal land, 100 which was consistent with the 
reasoning in earlier cases101 (even though some commentators suggested she 
had rewritten basic property law to reach that result). 102 Once the Court 
concluded the case arose on non-Indian land, Montana applied. 103 Strate is 
the first case in which the Court conclusively identified Montana as applying 
to all cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, 104 but Justice 
93. !d. at 432 (opinion of White, J.). 
94. See id. at 430 (opinion of White, J.) ("Montana should therefore not be understood to 
vest zoning authority in the tribe when fee land is used in certain ways. The governing principle 
is that the tribe has no authority itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal courts, to 
regulate the use of fee land."). 
95. !d. at 444 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
96. South Dakota v. Bourland arose on non-Indian fee lands on the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe's heavily checkerboarded reservation, and was similar to Montana, making it a relatively 
easy case for the Court. See 508 U.S. 679, 690 (1993). 
97. 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
98. See id. at 442. 
99. See id. at 443. 
100. See id. at 454. 
101. See id. at 456. 
102. E.g., Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian 
Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction among Tribal, State and Federal Governments, 
31 MCGEORGEL.REV. 973, lOll (2000). 
103. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-58 (applying Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 
(1981)). 
104. See id. at 445 ("Montana v. United States ... is the pathmarking case concerning tribal 
civil authority over nonmembers."). 
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Ginsburg was careful to note that Montana "governs" assertions of tribal 
jurisdiction on non-Indian lands. 105 
That said, the importance ofland ownership is unclear. The Court rejected 
the Montana I exception-commercial consensual relations106-on grounds 
that the accident had nothing to do with the reason the non-Indian was on the 
reservation. 107 The Court rejected the second Montana exception-conduct 
that "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe" 108-on grounds that 
the prosecution of the tribal court suit was not "needed to preserve 'the right 
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 109 
Importantly for the Court, the plaintiff all along had access to state courts to 
prosecute a tort claim. 110 Just as important, the Court found no reason relating 
to tribal sovereignty that compelled the Court to force the nonmember 
company to defend itself in an "unfamiliar court." 111 Unfortunately for tribal 
interests and Indian plaintiffs, the Court did not recognize that state courts, 
too, can be unfamiliar courts for Indian people. 
The next major tribal civil jurisdiction case, Nevada v. Hicks, 112 is one of 
the most unusual opinions in the field. Hicks involved a Section 1983 claim 
brought against a state law enforcement official in tribal court for on-
reservation conduct. 113 The filing ofjederal civil rights claims in tribal court 
against a state officer may have been unprecedented at the time of the suit, 
and most certainly was audacious. The state officer in question obtained a 
state court warrant to search the home of Floyd Hicks, a tribal member who 
resided on tribal lands. 114 The officer then had the state court warrant 
domesticated in the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone tribal court, state officials having 
105. !d. at 456. 
106. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (1981). 
107. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457. 
108. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
109. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
110. See id. 
111. !d. This is the first time the Court mentioned the potential disadvantage a nonmember 
defendant could have in tribal courts. I have suggested elsewhere that the Court's perception of 
tribal courts took a negative tum around the time Strate was decided. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Rebooting Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 55 S.D. L. REV. 510, 516 (2010) (citing Estates of 
Red Wolf and Bull Tail v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. 94-31 (Crow Court of Appeals, Feb. 21, 
1996); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1110, 1110 (2000)); see also Brief for the American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 438 (1997) 
(No. 95-1872), 1996 WL 711202 (describing the Red Wolf case). 
112. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001). 
113. See id. at 355-57. 
114. See id. at 355. 
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no obvious authority to search residences on triballands.m The officer was 
looking for evidence that Hicks had poached a California bighorn sheep off 
the reservation.U6 They (tribal police joined the state officer in the search) 
found nothing, but a year later a tribal police officer reported that he had seen 
two California bighorn sheep heads in Hicks' home. 117 They searched again, 
again finding no evidence, but this time the state officer did not have his state 
court warrant domesticated in tribal court. 118 Hicks brought suit in tribal court, 
and ultimately the Ninth Circuit held that the tribal court had jurisdiction to 
hear Section 1983 claims against state officers and that the officer was 
required to exhaust his tribal court remedies as to a qualified immunity 
defense before proceeding to federal court on that question. 119 
The Supreme Court's majority opinion analyzing this strange fact pattern 
is at least as strange as the facts. The Court held, as would be expected, that 
the State of Nevada should prevail in the matter, and that the tribal court did 
not have jurisdiction over the matter. 120 How the Court reached that 
conclusion is unusual. First, instead of addressing the meatier questions of 
whether a tribal court could have jurisdiction over a Section 1983 claim at 
all, whether Congress intended to waive state sovereign immunity in tribal 
court when it enacted Section 1983, and whether the state officer still may 
have retained qualified immunity from damages, the majority began with a 
discussion of Montana. 121 It is likely that the majority intended to directly 
rebut the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit, which had recognized broad tribal 
authority to exclude anyone, even state officers, from tribal lands: "The 
Tribe's unfettered power to exclude state officers from its land implies its 
authority to regulate the behavior of non-members on that land." 122 The Ninth 
Circuit also held that Montana did not apply at all to actions arising on tribal 
lands. 123 The majority's rigorous efforts to refute those conclusions 
apparently led it to focus first on the Montana-Strate line of cases. The 
majority specifically held that Montana applies to actions arising on tribal 
lands, but also held that landownership remained an important, if not 
115. See id. at 356. 
116. See id. 
117. Seeid. 
118. See id. 
119. See State of Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999). 
120. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 374. 
121. See id. at 358 ("The principle of Indian law central to this aspect of the case is our 
holding in Strate v. A -1 Contractors .... "). 
122. Hicks, 196 F.3d at 1028 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)) 
(emphasis added). 
123. See id. at 1025-30. 
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dispositive, factor. 124 However, the majority eventually held that state officers 
may enter Indian country to enforce state law, 125 rendering the Montana 
analysis unnecessary. 
Importantly for our purposes, however, the majority acknowledged that 
"Montana and Strate rejected tribal authority to regulate nonmembers' 
activities on land over which the tribe could not 'assert a landowner's right 
to occupy and exclude .... "'126 Moreover, the majority also acknowledged 
that whether tribal authority over nonmembers on Indian lands exists remains 
an open question. 127 
Another important element of the Hicks case was Justice Souter's 
concurring opinion focusing on the possible consequences of tribal court 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Justice Souter fleshed out the Court's 
concerns about the policy implications of tribal court jurisdiction over 
nonmembers first expressed in Duro v. Reina. 128 Justice Souter alleged that 
"outsiders" would not receive the benefit of adequate due process in tribal 
courts, citing respected scholarly works for the proposition that tribal courts 
had not interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act's due process guarantees 
consistent with federal precedents. 129 Justice Souter mentioned first that tribal 
justice system structures differ from American court systems. 130 Possibly he 
was referring to some tribal courts that utilize different structure, such as the 
two-judge Peacemakers' Court team mandated by the Seneca Nation of 
Indians Constitution, 131 or the fact that some tribal appellate courts are 
composed of the members of the tribal legislature, as is the case at Seneca. 132 
Or he could have been surprised to learn that many smaller tribes without 
enough resources to support a full-time tribal court systems associate with 
other small tribes in their region to form intertribal court systems, like the 
124. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 ("[Land ownership] may sometimes be a dispositive factor."). 
125. See id. at 361-62 ("State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border. ... 
'Ordinarily,' it is now clear, 'an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the 
State."') (citations omitted). 
126. !d. at 360 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 456; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 
(1981)). 
127. See id. at 358 n.2 ("Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court 
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court 
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general."). 
128. 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). 
129. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal 
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 
344 n.238 (1998)). 
130. See id. 
131. See SENECA NATION OF INDIANS CONST. § IV, para. 2, available at 
http:/ /sni.org/culture/seneca-nation-constitution!. 
132. See id. para. 9. 
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Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals of Nevada, 133 which decided the Hicks case on 
appeal from the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribal Court. 
Justice Souter expressed concern that tribal substantive law would be 
virtually unknowable to nonmembers because much of tribal law is 
unwritten. 134 It is true that many tribes are behind the times in making their 
court rules, codes and constitutions, and court opinions available to the 
public, 135 but to say that tribal common law is unwritten is ironic, given that 
federal common law is unwritten as well, until it is announced by the 
Supreme Court. 136 
Justice Souter unfortunately did not mention anything about the tribal 
courts whose jurisdiction was at issue in Hicks-the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone 
Tribal Court and the Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals of Nevada. The Inter-
Tribal Court of Appeals for Nevada had decided several appeals of judgments 
out of the Fallon Shoshone Tribal Court prior to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Hicks. 137 Justice Souter could have reviewed those opinions prior to 
13 3. "These inter-tribal courts of appeals include the Northwest Intertribal Court System, the 
Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals for Nevada, the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals, and 
the Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals." Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and 
Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REv. 577, 592 n.70 (2000) (citations omitted). 
134. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring). 
135. Thanks to the internet, tribes have made vast amounts of law available to the public 
since the Court decided Hicks. E.g., Pokagon Band ofPotawatomi Indians Tribal Court, available 
at http://www .pokagonband-nsn.gov/govemment/tribal-court (posting court rules, administrative 
orders, forms, and court opinions); Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi Indians Tribal 
Court, available at http://nhbpi.com/sovereignty/tribal-court!_(same). See generally Bonnie J. 
Shucha, "Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be": The (Un)Availablility ofTribal Law (Univ. 
of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1227, 2013), available at 
http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=23080 56. 
136. E.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005) 
(announcing the application of equitable defenses to certain tribal claims never before applied); 
Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (announcing 
a federal common law right to be free of unwarranted tribal civil jurisdiction and a federal 
common law cause of action, the so-called tribal court exhaustion doctrine, never before 
recognized by the Supreme Court); Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 
U.S. 226, 246 (1985) (announcing a federal common law cause of action allowing Indian tribes 
to sue to enforce rights under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177); cf generally Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (defining 
federal common law). 
137. See Ijames v. Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes, No. CR-FT-00-026, 2001 WL 36209877, 
at *1 (Nev. Inter-Tribal Ct. App. June 15, 2001); Fallon Bus. Council v. Cossette, No. CV -FT-
01-014, 2001 WL 36209922, at 1 (Nev. Inter-Tribal Ct. App. May 2, 2001); Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribal Council v. Moyle, No. CV-FT-00-024, 2000 WL 35782616, at *1 (Nev. Inter-
Tribal Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2000); Allen v. Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Housing Authority, No. HS-FT-
95-014(A) 1997 WL 34704384, at *1 (Nev. Inter-Tribal Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1997); Works v. Fallon 
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, No. CV-FT-96-014, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6033, 1997 WL 34704273, at *1 
(Nev. Inter-Tribal Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1997). Some of these opinions may not have been available 
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making broad judgments about the tribal appellate court. Works v. Fallon 
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, 138 for example, might have interested him. In that 
case, the tribal government sought to dismiss a civil rights claim against it, 
and the appellate court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act worked to waive 
tribal immunity from such claims. 139 Or he might have reviewed Allen v. 
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Housing Authority/40 in which the appellate court 
vacated a lower court judgment of damages and eviction against a housing 
authority tenant for due process violations. 141 Allen might have persuaded 
Justice Souter that the tribal courts respected due process in the same manner 
as American courts, while Works and Allen both might affirm for the Justice 
that the tribal court was willing to rule against the tribal government, a strong 
factor suggesting adequate judicial independence. 
In any event, the Hicks Court decided little, other than tribal courts may 
not entertain suits against state law enforcement officials, probably for 
federalism reasons. 142 The "open question" identified in Hicks, tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands, remains open. 143 
Now we turn to the theoretical grounding of the Supreme Court's 
decisions in the middle of the argument. Perhaps it is usual to identify and 
discuss first the overarching competing theories leading to doctrinal conflicts 
on the ground, but federal Indian law is as different as it is backwards, even 
here. Justice Scalia once wrote an internal memorandum to Justice Brennan 
arguing that since there were no significant theoretical constraints on the 
Court's Indian law decision-making, the Court's role was to seek "to discern 
what the current state of affairs ought to be .... " 144 Theories on federal Indian 
law typically are post hoc. 
for the Supreme Court to review. Cf Rusk v. Fallon Bus. Council, No. CV-FT-01-204, 2001 WL 
36210185, at *1 (Nev. Inter-Tribal Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2001) (decided a few months after Hicks). 
138. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6033, No. CV-FT-96-014, 1997 WL 34704273 (Nev. Inter-Tribal 
Ct.App.); see also Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights 
Act Thirty Years, 34lDAHOL. REV. 465,482 (1998) (discussing Works). 
139. See Works, 1997 WL 34704273, at *l. 
140. Allen,1997 WL 34704384, at *l. 
141. See id. at 2. 
142. See John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's 
Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 775-76 & n.266 (2006). 
143. The Court's most recent decision in the field, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 316 (2008), also arising on non-Indian lands, did little more 
than correct the errors of the lower court. 
144. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1573, 1575 (1996) (quoting Memorandum from 
Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., (Apr. 4, 1990), available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files. wordpress.com/20 12/11/ durovreinascaliamemo. pdf). 
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C. The War of Theories 
The federal common law of tribal authority focuses on one of two factors, 
applied on a case by case basis: (1) whether the tribal governance action 
involves activities on tribal lands, 145 or (2) whether the nonmember who is 
the subject to the tribal governance action has consented to tribal 
jurisdiction. 146 While scholarly views on these competing theories differ and 
the Court's opinions are not conclusive, the precedents suggest that consent-
based theories predominate in cases arising on Indian country lands that are 
in the control or ownership of nonmembers, and territorial-based theories 
predominate in cases arising on Indian country lands controlled or owned by 
Indian tribes. That said, it is apparent that in the past two decades or so, 
consent theorists have had the floor in the debate about tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. 
Consent-Based Jurisdiction 
Consent-based jurisdictional theory is far more restrictive on exercises of 
tribal governance and, in its purest form, likely would never allow tribal 
jurisdiction of any kind over nonconsenting nonmembers. The leading 
judicial theorist favoring consent-based tribal jurisdiction is Justice Kennedy. 
As far back as the 1970s, when he dissented in the Ninth Circuit's affirmation 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (a decision later overruled by 
the Supreme Court), Kennedy expressed concern about nonmembers being 
"subjected to cultural standards to which he is not accustomed" as a 
justification for limiting tribal authority over nonmembers. 147 Justice 
Kennedy later authored Duro v. Reina, 148 rejecting a territory-based theory of 
tribal jurisdiction in favor of a consent-based theory, arguing, "We hesitate 
to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of 
citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include 
them." 149 
Justice Kennedy stayed true to consent theory in the case where the 
Supreme Court affirmed Congress's authority to legislatively overrule Duro 
145. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 316 (2008) (tribal regulation of nonmember 
activities on nonmember lands); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 438 (1997) (same); 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 544 (1981) (same). 
146. E.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 645 (2001) (nonmember 
consent to tribal taxation); cf Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001) (state consent to tribal 
jurisdiction). 
147. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, C.J., 
dissenting), rev 'd, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978). 
148. 495 U.S. 676, 676 (1990). 
149. !d. at 693. 
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in United States v. Lara. 150 Justice Kennedy's concurrence reads like a 
dissent, arguing that Congress does not have the authority to recognize tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. 151 He harshly criticized the majority, 
arguing, "Lara, after all, is a citizen of the United States. To hold that 
Congress can subject him, within our domestic borders, to a sovereignty 
outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a serious step." 152 Justice 
Kennedy's consent-based theory derives from his views on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, and he has not expressed a view on whether consent-based 
theory should control on tribal lands in civil cases. 153 
Scholarly criticism of Justice Kennedy's consent-based theory abounds. 
As the late Professor Phil Frickey and political philosopher Professor Jacob 
Levy established, refocusing tribal authority on consent and membership is 
an odd and unpersuasive theoretical play. 154 In one Professor Frickey's 
strongest criticisms, he argued that "tribes may be judicially subjugated based 
on the mystical implications of a document by which they have never 
consented to be bound and to which they have never even been coercively 
tied through the formal procedures specified in the document, because the 
document is manifestly good." 155 Professor Levy similarly refers to Justice 
Kennedy's statements on consent-based sovereignty as "not particularly good 
political theory." 156 
It should be noted that consent-based theorists are sympathetic to 
consensual relations between tribes and nonmembers. Hundreds of thousands 
of nonmembers consent to some form of tribal jurisdiction every day. Those 
individual consents, usually arising out of a particular transaction, authorize 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. This consent is limited to the 
transaction, and must be express. Despite the range of consent ongoing in 
modern tribal affairs, individualized, transaction-specific, and express 
consent is no way to effectively govern territory. 
Territory-Based Jurisdiction 
The leading judicial theorist favoring territorial-based jurisdiction may 
have been then-Associate Justice Rehnquist. He authored the majority 
opinion in United States v. Mazurie, 157 holding that Indian tribes retain 
150. 541 U.S. 193, 193 (2004). 
151. See i d. at 211. 
152. !d. at 212. 
153. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 687-88. 
154. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 465-68; Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 
12 TEx. REV. L. &POL. 329,356-57 (2008). 
155. Frickey, supra note 1, at 468. 
156. Levy, supra note 154, at 356. 
157. 419 U.S. 544, 544 (1975). 
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sufficient authority to exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in 
instances where Congress has delegated general regulatory authority. 158 
Expressly rejecting the consent-based theory of tribal jurisdiction adopted by 
the Tenth Circuit/59 then-Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[Our c]ases ... surely 
establish the proposition that Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good 
deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations,' and they thus undermine 
the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision." 160 
The Mazurie Court's rejection of the purest form of consent-based 
jurisdiction adopted by the lower court was not a complete endorsement of 
"full territorial sovereignty," or "the power to enforce laws against all who 
come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens." 161 But it 
was close, and constituted a stinging rebuke of the purest form of consent-
theory later articulated by Justice Kennedy. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "The 
fact that the Mazuries could not become members of the tribe, and therefore 
could not participate in the tribal government, does not alter our conclusion. 
This claim ... is answered by this Court's opinion in Williams v. Lee." 162 
The Supreme Court has never fully reconciled its competing theories on 
consent-based versus territory-based jurisdiction, probably because it has not 
yet addressed a case involving tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on 
tribal lands. Later, in Part III, I propose a unification of the two theories, with 
an emphasis on territory-based jurisdiction, but with a respectful eye toward 
consent theory. 
We now tum briefly to the federal common law on the process by which 
nonmembers may challenge tribal civil jurisdiction. 
D. The Tribal Court Exhaustion Doctrine 
In a pair of cases decided in the mid-1980s, the Court held that 
nonmembers have a federal common law right and cause of action to 
challenge tribal jurisdiction over them. 163 However, the nonmember 
challenger must first exhaust all tribal remedies before bringing the federal 
158. See id. at 557. 
159. See United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14, 19 (lOth Cir. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 544, 
544 (1975). 
160. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted). 
161. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (emphasis added). This is the position from 
which Justice Kennedy began Duro, only to reject its application in favor a consent -based theory. 
162. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557-58 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) 
(citations omitted). 
163. See IowaMut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 9 (1987); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. 
v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 845 (1985). 
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suit. 164 Tribal exhaustion is excused where "an assertion of tribal jurisdiction 
'is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or where the 
action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where 
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to 
challenge the court's jurisdiction."165 The Supreme Court, interestingly, 
forbade federal courts from looking into whether tribal forums were biased 
or incompetent. 166 
The justifications for excusing tribal exhaustion are curious. The Court in 
National Farmers Union borrowed this list of exceptions from its 
jurisprudence surrounding the Younger abstention doctrine. 167 The Younger 
abstention doctrine forecloses federal court jurisdiction over federal claims 
where a state court is currently handling a claim under the same facts. 168 
Younger's basis is in federalism and the relationship between state and 
federal courts. While the Court's decision to limit nonmember challenges to 
tribal authority to simply questions about jurisdiction is strongly supportive 
of tribal sovereignty, 169 it effectively (and ironically) undercut tribal authority 
in the long term. 
We now turn to the meat of the paper-the legal and policy reasons 
favoring and disfavoring tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal 
lands. 
II. LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS RELATING TO TRIBAL CIVIL 
JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS ON TRIBAL LANDS 
As a general matter, the Supreme Court "may not sit as a superlegislature 
to judge the wisdom or desirability oflegislative policy determinations made 
in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines 
.. "
170 However, in an area of federal common law that tends to exclude 
164. See IowaMut., 480 U.S. at 19 n.12; Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.2l. 
165. Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citation omitted). 
166. See IowaMut., 480 U.S. at 18-19. 
167. See Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 
338 (1977)). 
168. See Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43 (1971). 
169. See IowaMut., 480 U.S. at 19. 
170. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit 
as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which 
it expresses offends the public welfare."). But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 
(1963) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety oflaws 
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates 
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and fueir physician's role in one aspect of 
that relation."). 
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state law like federal Indian law, 171 the Supreme Court has a stronger claim 
to asserting a policymaking role than in other fields of constitutional law. 
Congress has not legislated conclusively in the field of tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers. 
In the absence of Congressional action, and given the federal Indian law 
is largely an area of federal common law, it is entirely appropriate to consider 
the various public policy reasons for and against recognition of tribal civil 
authority over nonmembers on tribal lands. 
A. Legal and Policy Support for Tribal Jurisdiction 
Policy justifications for tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers have never 
been comprehensively (or persuasively) articulated by tribal advocates. 
While there are several salient, if subjective, policy reasons for tribal 
jurisdiction, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet found any 
of them dispositive. I argue, however, that the following justifications 
sufficiently support a presumption that tribal governments and tribal courts 
may exercise civil authority over nonmembers on tribal lands. 
1. Congressional and Executive Public Policy 
The first reason to support tribal jurisdiction is one articulated by the 
Supreme Court-Congressional policy preferences favoring the development 
of tribal justice systems. 172 Congressional policy favors tribal self-
determination, but Congress has never legislated conclusively on the specific 
question of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 173 
The history of federal support for Indian courts is murky. 174 The United 
States strongly supported the first visible tribal court, that of the Cherokee 
Nation before removal to the western lands in the Trail of Tears. J. Matthew 
Martin demonstrated that American officials once turned over an American 
citizen for prosecution in Cherokee courts. 175 In the early- to mid-nineteenth 
171. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985). 
172. See Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 (1985). 
173. See Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, supra note 20, at 147-50; 
Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113, 113 (Nov.-
Dec. 1995). 
17 4. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. L Y1LE, AMERICAN INDIAN, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 110-38 (1983) (surveying "the Indian Judicial System"); NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT 
JUDGES Ass'N., supra note 31, at 7-13 (summarizing history oflndian courts). 
175. See J. Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction 
by the Cherokee Supreme Court, 1823 1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 27, 58-60 (2009); id. at 59 
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century, as the Supreme Court recounted in United States v. Wheeler, 176 
Congress frequently legislated in the field of law and order in Indian country 
with a presumption that Indian tribes had exclusive authority to prosecute 
Indian crimes. 177 Even as late as 1870, Congress expressed its understanding 
that Indian tribes had inherent authority, even to exercise capital punishment: 
"Their right of self government, and to administer justice among themselves, 
after their rude fashion, even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty, has 
never been questioned .... "178 
However, later in the nineteenth century, federal officials instituted on-
reservation courts called Courts of Indian Offenses, later termed "CFR 
Courts," that often served as "instruments of cultural oppression since some 
of the offenses that were tried in these courts had more to do with suppressing 
religious dances and certain kinds of ceremonials than with keeping law and 
order."179 These institutions undermined tribal governance. In 1885, Congress 
enacted the Major Crimes Act, authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country for seven major felonies/ 80 further undermining tribal 
governance. 181 
Federal policy support for modern, formalized tribal justice systems 
actually operated by Indian tribes did not exist until 1934, when Congress 
("As early as June of 1824, Agent McMinn advised the Secretary of War that he had turned a 
white man over to the Cherokee Light Horse for criminal punishment.") (footnotes omitted). 
176. 435 U.S. 313,313 (1978). 
177. See id. at 324-25. In detail, the Court recounted several instances where Congress 
expressed this presumption. See id. (citing Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of July 22, 1790, 
§ 5, 1 Stat. 138; Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383; Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1834, § 25,4 Stat. 733; General Crimes Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2013); Act of Mar. 27, 
1854, § 3, 10 Stat. 270). 
178. !d. at 325 n.23 (quoting S. REP. No. 268, at lO (1870)). 
179. DELORIA&LY1LE, supra note 174, at 115; see also United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 
577 (D. Or. 1888) ("'n fact, the reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are 
gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and 
aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man."); id. at 579 (noting that 
Courts of Indian Offenses were a "laudable effort to accustom and educate these Indians in the 
habit and knowledge of self-government"). 
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2014). The history of the enactment of the Major Crimes Act is 
legendary, and came shortly after the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 
556 (1883), holding that federal prosecutors could not prosecute an Indian for an on-reservation 
crime against another Indian. 
181. Some scholars argue that the Major Crimes Act continues to undermine tribal 
governance, see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 
N.C. L. REv. 779, 853 (2006), and perhaps is even unconstitutional, see Troy A. Eid & Carrie 
Covington Doyle, Separate but Unequal: The Federal Criminal Justice System in Indian Country, 
81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1104 (2010). 
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passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 182 The Act encouraged tribes to 
"reorganize" as constitutional democracies. 183 The IRA-era constitutions that 
included reference to tribal courts usually made those courts subject to the 
creation, and therefore repeal, oftribal councils (legislatures). 184 Thus arose 
the structural problem of a lack of judicial independence from political 
interference by tribal politicians, which we will discuss in Part II(B)(3). 
However, not all IRA constitutions provided for tribal courts. Many 
reservations with active Courts of Indian Offenses (CIO) or CFR Courts 
simply retained those courts. 185 As such, while not all tribes had active tribal 
justice systems, those that did had either tribal courts created by tribal 
legislatures or CIO/CFR courts operated, in all relevant respects, by the 
federal government. Complicating matters further was Congress's dramatic 
turn toward the termination of federal-tribal relations in the 1950s/86 
rendering support for the development of tribal justice systems even more 
precanous. 
In 1959, however, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee, 187 roundly 
affirming inherent, and exclusive, tribal authority to adjudicate civil disputes 
arising in Indian country involving reservation Indians (as defendants). 188 
Williams recognized that Congress intended the IRA to be a vehicle for the 
development of tribal justice systems. 189 The Court also noted that the tribal 
justice system at issue, the Navajo judiciary, was exemplary: "The Tribe itself 
has in recent years greatly improved its legal system through increased 
182. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 
(2013)). 
183. See 25 U.S.C. § 476. 
184. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. 
REV. 225, 236 (1994). Professors Elmer Rusco and David Wilkins have effectively pointed out 
that these early constitutions, usually derided as "boilerplate" or "model IRA" constitutions, are 
not as uniform as many assume. See David E. Wilkins, Introduction to FELIX S. COHEN, ON TIIE 
DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xi, xxiii (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006) (discussing ELMER 
RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TilE INDIAN 
REORGANIZATION ACT (2000)). Regardless, their major problem is the built -in approvals required 
from the Secretary oflnterior. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 198 (1985); 
Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian SelfDetermination at Bay: Secretarial 
Authority to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 81, 92-93 (1993-
1994 ). For example, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community Constitution even provides a detailed 
process for seeking Secretarial approval of tribal ordinances. KEWEENAw BAY INDIAN CMTY. 
CONST. art. VI,§ 2. 
185. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 184, at 235-36. 
186. See Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 49. 
187. 358 U.S. 217,217 (1959). 
188. See id. at 220-22. 
189. See id. at 220 ("Not satisfied solely with centralized govermnent of Indians, it 
encouraged tribal govermnents and courts to become stronger and more highly organized.") 
(citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477). 
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expenditures and better-trained personnel. Today the Navajo Courts oflndian 
Offenses exercise broad criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by 
outsiders against Indian defendants." 190 
During the 1950s and 1960s, federal courts heard a smattering of 
challenges to tribal governance and tribal court authority from both Indians 
and non-Indians. 191 These cases generally affirmed inherent tribal authority 
to govern their territories, sometime holding that American constitutional 
precedents were irrelevant to tribal governance because the American 
Constitution simply did not apply to tribal governments. 192 Those cases, and 
the collective stories recited in their fact patterns, I suspect, skewed outsiders' 
perceptions of tribal governments. Only persons opposed to tribal authority, 
and losers to tribal governments in tribal courts, filed federal appeals. 
Additionally, in the early and mid-1960s, Senator Ervin, chair of the 
Constitutional Rights Committee and a conservative, segregationist, southern 
Democrat, 193 held a series of a hearings in which gave a platform to anyone 
with a beef against tribal governments. While many legitimate concerns came 
to the forefront, most notably in the area of tribal criminal justice, 194 the 
hearings further built a skewed record of tribal abuses of power. Coupled with 
the federal court cases challenging tribal governance, the Senate hearings 
made tribal governments look illiberal, to say the least. 195 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 196 
Congress intended that ICRA affect tribal criminal processes more than civil 
190. !d. at 222 (footnotes omitted). 
191. E.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minn. Indian Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th 
Cir. 1967) (rejecting claims relating to tribal membership and constitutional law); Colliflower v. 
Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) (granting federal habeas writ to incarcerated tribal 
member); Native Am. Church ofN. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (lOth Cir. 1959) 
(rejecting claims by members and nonmembers that the Navajo ban on peyote violated the First 
Amendment); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 
1958) (affirming inherent authority of Indian tribes to collect taxes from tribal members); Iron 
Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Toledo 
v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (rejecting claim by tribal members of 
religious discrimination by the tribal government); Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 441 P.2d 
167 (Idaho 1968) (dismissing tribal member claim for reinstatement to tribal council for lack of 
state court jurisdiction). 
192. See Native Am. Church, 272 F.2d at 134-35. 
193. For a biography of Sen. Ervin, see KARLE. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, LAST OF 
TilE FOUNDING FA TilERS (2007). 
194. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 
9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557,579-81 (1972). See also Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Title 11 ofthe 1968 Civil 
Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REV. 337, 340-44 (1968) (detailing illiberal civil 
jurisdiction cases). 
195. See generally AngelaR. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
799, 799 (2007). 
196. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2013). 
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processes, and even provided for a federal habeas right to challenge tribal 
convictions. 197 However, ICRA made no distinction between criminal and 
civil tribal court actions, and also made no distinction between cases solely 
involving tribal members and those involving nonmembers. 198 In Congress' 
most important modem venture into tribal law, Congress expressed no 
opinion on the question of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
Still, ICRA evolved into a powerful statement of federal policy on tribal 
justice systems. Five years after its enactment, the Department of Justice took 
efforts to enforce ICRA against Indian tribes. 199 But in 1978, the Supreme 
Court held in a stunning opinion, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 200 that 
ICRA does not operate as a Congressional waiver of tribal sovereign 
immunity, 201 and that no federal common law cause of action arises to enforce 
the civil rights protections of the Indian Bill ofRights. 202 The Martinez Court 
pointed out that Congress expressly provided for the development of tribal 
law by mandating that the Secretary of Interior develop a model tribal code. 203 
But the Court went much further and expressly ratified tribal courts and even 
informal, nonjudicial tribal bodies, as appropriate and competent to 
adjudicate and protect individual rights under ICRA, writing, "Tribal forums 
are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and § 1302 has the 
substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these forums are 
obliged to apply."204 The Court even pointed out that federal and state courts 
have given full faith and credit to tribal court judgments in some instances. 205 
The Court's interpretation of the views of Congress in regards to tribal 
courts in the years leading up to the enactment of ICRA was undoubtedly 
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1303; see Riley, supra note 195, at 809. 
198. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall ... deny to any person within its JUrisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any 
person of liberty or property without due process of law .... ") (emphasis added). 
199. See Lawrence Baca, Reflections on the Role of the United States Department of Justice 
in Enforcing the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY, supra note 
53, at 1, 3. 
200. 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978). 
201. See id. at 58-59 ("It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied 
but must be unequivocally expressed.' Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to 
subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory 
relief.") (quotations and citations omitted). 
202. See id. at 60-69. 
203. Seeid. at64&n.17(citing25U.S.C. § 1311). 
204. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65--66 (citing Fisherv. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 382 (1976); 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217 (1959); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 556 (1883), and 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 544 (1975)) (footnotes omitted). 
205. See id. at 65 n.21 (citing United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 100 
(1856); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (8th Cir. 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 999, 999 
(1896)). 
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rose-colored. Congress would not have enacted the Indian Bill of Rights if 
there was sufficient evidence to show that tribal forums adequately 
guaranteed due process to litigants, and that individuals under tribal 
government authority had adequate forums to redress their grievances with 
tribes. ICRA' s legislative history was much more negative toward tribal 
courts. 206 Most tribal courts, for example, effectively banned the presence of 
attorneys, 207 reasoning that the presence of lawyers would undermine their 
customs and traditions, formalize the courts' informal processes, and 
intimidate tribal judges (most of whom were not lawyers). 208 Many 
reservation communities held a deep distrust of lawyers. 209 As a result, 
reservation justice could be an informal, even rough, affair. 210 Even though 
ICRA's legislative history focused heavily on anecdotal evidence, and was 
subject to exaggeration, there was a significant amount of evidence of abuses 
by tribal governments and tribal judges. 211 
Even so, the Martinez Court was correct that Congress intended to protect 
internal tribal governance by Indian tribes, with an emphasis on developing 
tribal court systems. 212 A few years later in National Farmers Union, 213 the 
Supreme Court quoted an 1855 Attorney General Opinion that tribes retained 
the inherent power to adjudicate civil cases involving nonmembers, which 
asserted, "'By all possible rules of construction the inference is clear that 
jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil controversies arising 
strictly within the Choctaw Nation. "'214 
206. See generally Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tightening the Perceived "Loophole": 
Reexamining ICRA 's Limitation on Tribal Court Punishment Authority, in THE INDIAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY, supra note 53, at 211, 219-25; Michael Reese, The Indian Civil Rights 
Act: Conflict between Constitutional Assimilation and Tribal SelfDetermination, 20 
SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 29,20 (1992). 
207. See Burnett, Jr., supra note 194, at 579. 
208. See NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N., supra note 31, at 63 ("Some judges are 
intimidated by and overwhelmed by the presence of attorneys .... [R]epresented [parties] tend[] 
to dominate court proceedings."); Reese, supra note 206, at 37 ("The right to counsel issue was 
perhaps the most intensely debated aspect of the ICRA during the legislative process. It was 
certainly a concept opposed by many Indian groups."). 
209. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Dibakonigowin: Indian Lawyer as Abductee, 31 OKLA. 
CITY L. REV. 209, 222-224 (2006) (discussing SHERMAN ALEXIE, Lawyer's League, in TEN 
LITTLE INDIANS 53 (2003), and Carey N. Vicenti, The Social Structures of Legal Neocolonialism 
in Native America, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 513, 513 (2001)). 
210. E.g., NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N., supra note 31, at 55-56 (noting tribal 
lawyer's 90 percent conviction rate in tribal court). 
211. See generally Burnett, Jr., supra note 194; Lazarus, supra note 194. 
212. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60-69 (1978). 
213. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
214. !d. at 855 (quoting 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 175, 179-81 (1855)). 
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The Court recognized the Congressional support for tribal self-
determination, holding again that the "orderly administration of justice" in 
Indian country is best protected by tribal courts. 215 In Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. LaPlante,216 a sequel of sorts to National Farmers Union, the Supreme 
Court declined to consider the nonmember's argument that the tribal courts 
were incompetent and biased, holding that to consider such a claim "would 
be contrary to the congressional policy promoting the development of tribal 
courts. "217 
Since Iowa Mutual, Congressional and Executive branch support for tribal 
self-determination and the development of tribal courts has continued, albeit 
more tepidly than tribal advocates would like to see, 218 while the Supreme 
Court's deference to Congressional policy has dissipated. 219 
Congress's support for tribal justice systems continued into the 21st 
century. In 1991, Congress passed an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, called colloquially "the Duro fix," 220 to reverse a 1990 Supreme Court 
decision extending the holding in Oliphant to nonmember Indians. 221 In 1993, 
Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act. 222 Congress's statement of 
policy, while general, was still powerfully supportive of the development of 
tribal courts.223 Attorney General Janet Reno presided over the establishment 
of the Office of Tribal Justice in 1994.224 In 2000, Congress enacted the Indian 
Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act. 225 Like the 1993 Act, 
Congress's statement of policy again supported tribal courts. 226 Finally, in 
2010 and again in 2013, Congress enhanced tribal criminal jurisdiction and 
215. !d. at 856. 
216. IowaMut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
217. !d. at 18-19. 
218. See Joseph A. Myers & Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, 
Present, and Future, 79 JUDICATURE 147 (1995). 
219. See Fletcher, Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, supra note 20, at 154-63. 
220. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1892, 1892-93 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2014)). For legislative history, see H.R. REP. 102-
261 (1991); S. REP. 102-153 (1991). 
221. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679, 698 (1990). 
222. Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004, 2004 (1993) (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 3601-02,3611-14,3621,3631 (2012)). 
223. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601(4)-(9) (2012). 
224. See Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113, 
114 (1995). 
225. Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 
§ 2, 114 Stat. 2778,2778 (2000) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3651-53,3661--66, 3681-82 (2000)). 
226. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651(5)-(11) (2012). 
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sentencing authority for tribal justice systems with qualifying legal structures 
guaranteeing minimum constitutional rights to defendants. 227 
None of these enactments and policy actions broadly recognized tribal 
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. A 2000 Congressional enactment 
relating to prevention of violence against women included a provision linking 
tribal and state courts; the provision required each jurisdiction to give "full 
faith and credit" to the personal protection orders of another tribe or state. 228 
Unfortunately, the statute backed down from recognizing tribal authority to 
issue orders involving nonmember defendants, and instead provided, in 
possibly one of the most circular federal statutory enactments in modem 
times, that tribal courts have "full" civil jurisdiction in all matters "arising 
within the authority of the tribe," and even then only in specified instances of 
civil contempt and banishment. 229 
2. Protecting the Dignity of the Tribal Sovereign 
A second reason to support tribal jurisdiction is to protect and preserve the 
dignity of the tribal sovereign. The Supreme Court, interpreting the 
Constitution, recognizes that state governments are lesser sovereigns entitled 
to retain their dignity as sovereigns, even as the Constitution limits their full 
authority. 230 More practically, when a criminal act occurs, the law recognizes 
that the criminal has violated the dignity of the sovereign. 231 However, 
excepting one remarkable concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor, 232 
federal and state courts do not typically recognize the dignity of tribal 
sovereigns. 233 Nor perhaps should they-tribes are not a party to the 
227. See Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 2279 
(2010) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)-(d)) (enhancing tribal sentencing authority); Violence 
Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, Title IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 
54, 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304) (tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic 
violence perpetrators). 
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2012). 
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (2012). 
230. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) ("The States thus retain 'a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty.' ... They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political 
corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty." Quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)). See also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 
U.S. 743, 760 (2002) ("The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States 
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities."). 
231. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). 
232. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2042 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (arguing the Court should reach a result that would "respect the dignity of Indian 
Tribes"). 
233. Cf Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe ofldaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (noting the threat 
to a State's dignity in being subjected to a suit by an Indian tribe). 
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American constitutional structure. 234 And yet, nonmembers sue Indian tribes 
in courts foreign to those tribes routinely, subjecting tribal interests to 
adjudication under foreign procedures and substantive laws. 235 
Consider the theory undergirding adjudicatory jurisdiction over a tort 
committed within the territory of a sovereign. The local court, under normal 
circumstances, has territorial jurisdiction over the tortfeasor. 236 Dean Beale 
argued that the proper theoretical basis for local jurisdiction by a smaller 
political entity with "small or even of disconnected portions of territory" was 
not some abstract fealty to a sovereign entity (such as a king or an Indian 
tribe), but reliance upon the territorial reach of the sovereign. 237 In England, 
Dean Beale's preferred subject, torts committed within the territory of the 
sovereign, like crimes, amounted to a form of trespass, "violations of public 
order .... "238 Naturally speaking (natural law is at play here), the sovereign 
has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate these trespasses to the public order. 239 
Under this theory, it follows that the argument favoring tribal general 
jurisdiction is stronger in cases involving a tort arising on tribal lands, as 
opposed to lands within reservation borders that have fallen out of tribal or 
individual Indian ownership. The limited territorial reach of the sovereign is 
the core of new scholarship in the field of tribal sovereignty. 240 This is a 
significant retreat from how state court general territorial jurisdiction is 
understood, in that land ownership is not relevant to jurisdiction.241 Such a 
retreat makes some sense, given that the Supreme Court's Montana-Strate 
line of cases applies on non-tribal lands within reservation borders. 242 
Brandishing the dignity of tribal sovereignty as a tool to justify the 
exercise of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, even on tribal lands where 
the argument is strongest, is fraught with peril. Not everyone is persuaded. In 
234. The Supreme Court does recognize some aspects of the dignity of foreign sovereigns, 
e.g., Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. China, 348 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1955); Schooner Exch. v. 
McFaddon, ll U.S. 116, 131 (1812), but Indian tribes are not foreign sovereigns, either, see 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1831). 
235. E.g., Kronerv. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 819 N.W.2d 264, 265--67 (Wis. 2012) 
(Crooks, J.) (reinstating state court suit by nonmember former employee of tribal corporation). 
236. See Joseph Henry Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 HARV. L. REv. 283, 
284-85 (1912). 
237. See id. at 283-85. 
238. !d. at 284. 
239. See id. 
240. See Christenson, supra note 26 at 527; Florey, supra note 10 at 603. 
241. Cf State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 672-73 (Md. App. Ct. 1999) ("Territorial jurisdiction 
describes the concept that only when an offense is committed within tile boundaries of tile court's 
jurisdictional geographic territory, which generally is within the boundaries of the respective 
states, may the case be tried in fuat state."). 
242. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,445 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
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1958, in the Termination Era, one commentator argued that "tribal 
sovereignty as a force in itself has been pure legal fiction for decades-a 
fiction preserved by the courts in order to assist Congress in educating the 
tribesmen in the responsibilities of citizenship, to check Federal excesses, and 
to repel unwarranted interference by the states."243 Setting aside the internal 
contradictions of the author's supposition, the notion that tribal sovereignty 
is a "fiction," a sort of high-stakes game that the federal government plays 
with Indians, remains in the minds of some judges. Consider Janss v. Sac and 
Fox Tribe of the Meskawki, 244 where a magistrate judge ordered the tribe to 
pay a civil judgment of over $2,500 to the plaintiff in a small claims case. 245 
When tribe raised its immunity from suit as a defense, the magistrate referred 
to tribal court jurisdiction as "ludicrous,"246 and held that the tribe simply was 
not a sovereign entity: "The Tribe asserts that it is sovereign and yet lacks 
many of the muniments of sovereignty."247 
At least one Supreme Court Justice has advanced a tentative theory that 
would disempower Indian nations completely. In 2004, Justice Thomas 
offered a theory-agreed upon by no other Justice-for finding tribal 
sovereignty to be illusory. 248 Congress in 1871, he argued, ended recognition 
of tribal sovereignty when it enacted a statute (one he admits is likely 
unconstitutional) prohibiting the President from negotiating treaties with 
Indian tribes. 249 
While it is clear these are outlier opinions, unconvinced by the real fact 
that Indian tribes do retain very significant aspects of sovereignty,250 the 
reality is that some judges doubt tribal sovereignty. This is reason enough not 
to pin hopes on the judicial recognition of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers 
on respect for the dignity of tribal sovereignty. 
The remaining reasons for courts to recognize presumptive civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands are pragmatic and, in my view, 
far more persuasive. 
243. Robert W. Oliver, The Legal Status of Indian Tribes, 38 OR. L. REv. 193, 231 (1959). 
244. No. SCSC011994 (Tama Co. Dist. Ct., April 20, 2011), available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 ll/04/tama-county-magistrates-order-filed-4-20-ll.pdf. 
245. See id. at 2. 
246. !d. 
247. !d. at 3. 
248. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
249. See id. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
250. Even Senators Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and Coburn, who strongly opposed the tribal 
jurisdiction provisions of the VA W A reauthorization, recognized that Indian tribes retain 
important aspects of internal sovereignty. See S. REP. 112-153, at 36, 40-41, 51-55 (2012). 
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3. Improved Tribal Governance Capacity 
In the twenty-first century, Indian tribes have improved their capacity to 
govern beyond any reasonable observer's mid-twentieth century 
expectations. Congress' turn toward the encouragement of tribal self-
determination in the 1970s allowed tribes to administer their own government 
programs, and become experts on administering federal money. Moreover, 
the influx of Indian economic development money (mostly gaming and 
natural resource extraction) into many areas of Indian country has forced 
tribes to develop critically important financial controls and money 
management systems. And, at least in some jurisdictions, tribes, states, and 
local units of government are cooperating to wipe away complex 
jurisdictional differences. 
a. Indian Self-Determination Contracting 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act. 251 Section 102 of the Act, 252 the heart of the law, required the 
Secretary of Interior to enter into self-determination compacts (later known 
as "638 contracts," after the number of the Public Law) at the request of an 
Indian tribe. 253 These 638 contracts allowed tribes to choose from the menu 
of tribal programs administered by the Bureau oflndian Affairs or the Indian 
Health Service, present a resolution to Interior requesting control (and 
appropriations) over those programs, and then take control over them. 254 The 
functions include programs like membership and enrollment, tribal court, 
police, fire, ambulance, natural resources and conservation, education, 
employment training, health care, and anything else the tribal government 
does with federal money. Once tribal governments took over the federal 
program, the statute required the tribe to comply with numerous and complex 
federal fiscal management regulations. Some tribes in the early years only 
took over smaller programs at first, leaving difficult programs, such as law 
251. Indian Self-Detennination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 
(1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (2014)). 
252. 25 U.S.C. § 450f. Felix Cohen's original draft of what would become the Indian 
Reorganization Act included a similar provision, but Congress chose to exclude that provision, in 
part because of wide political opposition. See Lawrence C. Kelly, The Indian Reorganization Act: 
The Dream and the Reality, 44 PAC. HIST. REv. 291, 293-94, 296-97 (1975). 
253. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(l) ("The Secretary is directed, upon the request of any Indian 
tribe by tribal resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract or contracts with a tribal 
organization to plan, conduct, and administer programs or portions thereof, including construction 
programs .... "). 
254. See KevinK. Washburn, Tribal SelfDetermination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REv. 
777, 779-80 (2006). 
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enforcement and health care, to the federal agencies until the tribe established 
its governance capacity to take over and operate the programs competently. 
Self-determination compacting was a runaway success, and in 1988 
Congress started the Tribal Self-Governance program as a demonstration 
project,255 which Congress made permanent in 1994.256 Under this program, 
qualifying tribes may administer all of the federal programs previously 
administered or co-administered by the Secretary of Interior through a 
funding agreement with the agency. 257 One tribal leader said the self-
governance policy was "the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted by 
the United States."258 
Self-governance tribes are at the pinnacle of modern tribal governance. 259 
There are about 260 self-governance tribes, 260 or about 45% of federally 
recognized tribes. Former Bureau of Indian Affairs official George Skibine 
mentioned the success of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, one of the 
biggest economic engines of southwestern Oklahoma, 261 showing how self-
governance and the development of tribal justice systems are directly 
related. 262 
Other tribes have used their self-determination and self-governance 
contracts to take control (and in some cases establish) a tribal justice system. 
255. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-472, 102 
Stat 2285, 2296. 
256. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-413, 108 Stat 
4250, 4272-78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa-hh). 
257. See 25 U.S.C. § 450cc. 
258. Miccosukee Tribe oflndians Chairman Billy Cypress, quoted inS. Bobo Dean& Joseph 
H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal Self 
Determination, 36 TuLSA L.J. 349, 350 (2000). 
259. See generally Indian Tribal SelfGovernance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, ll1th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2010) (statement of George Skibine, Acting Principal Deputy, 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Dept. of Interior). 
260. See H.R. 4347 The Department of Interior Tribal SelfGovernance Act: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, lllth Cong. (June 9, 2010) (statement of Laura Davis) 
("Tribal participation in self-governance has progressed from seven tribes and total obligations 
of about $27 million in 1991 to an expected 100 agreements including 260 federally recognized 
tribes and obligations in excess of $420 million in FY 20 11."), available at 
http:/ /www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/111/DOITribalSelfGovernance _ 0609lO.cfm. 
261. See Oklahoma City University Study Reveals Substantial Economic Impact of the 
Chickasaw Nation on Oklahoma's Economy, Bus. WIRE (July 9, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://www .businesswire.com/news/home/20 120709006087 /en/Oklahoma -City-University-
Study-Reveals-Substantial-Economic ("The contribution and impact of the Chickasaw Nation on 
the economy of Oklahoma exceeds $2.4 billion dollars according to an economic impact analysis 
released today by the Steven C. Agee Economic Research & Policy Institute at Oklahoma City 
University."). 
262. Indian Tribal SelfGovernance, supra note 259 (discussing how self-governance 
encouraged the development of the Chickasaw tribal judiciary). 
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The Hoopa Valley Tribe recently testified in Congressional hearings on the 
self-governance program how its development under the early 638 contracts 
led to the establishment of its tribal justice and court system, which now has 
the respect oflocallaw enforcement as demonstrated by a cross-deputization 
in place between the Tribe and Humboldt County. 263 The Citizen Potawatomi 
Nation established its own tribal justice system in recent decades that, 
according to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development, "function[s] at a level of sufficiently high quality such that it 
has attracted tens of millions of dollars of capital to the Nation's business 
enterprises and induced a neighboring non-Indian township to opt into the 
Potawatomi system and out of the State of Oklahoma system for its municipal 
court services."264 
b. Intergovernmental Agreement and Cooperation 
Perhaps a more persuasive objective indicator of the improvement in tribal 
governance capacity is the dramatic rise in intergovernmental agreements 
between Indian tribes and state and local governments. Agreements over 
taxes, zoning, law enforcement jurisdiction, and any number of other issues 
between tribes and local and state governments have been around since the 
1960s, but their number has increased dramatically since the Supreme 
Court's mention of them in a 1991 Indian tax case, Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe. 265 
The most pressing pragmatic and political issues between states and local 
governments and Indian tribes involved law enforcement and taxation. Tribes 
and local law enforcement jurisdictions have entered into cross-deputization 
and cooperative agreements for many decades now, with excellent results. 
Intergovernmental agreements may arise in an incredibly wide variety of 
subject areas. 266 There is no incentive to cheat, unlike in tax agreements, 
263. See The Success and Shortfall ofSelfGovernance under the Indian SelfDetermination 
and Education Assistance Act after Twenty Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
110th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (May 13, 2008) (statement of Clifford Lyle Marshall, Chairman, Hoopa 
Valley Tribe). 
264. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, American Indian SelfDetermination: The Political 
Economy of a Policy that Works 12 (HaNard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Res. Working Paper Series 
RWP10-043, 2010), available at 
http:/ /web .hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?Publd=7 4 77. 
265. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 
514 (1991) ("States may also enter into agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory 
regime for the collection of this sort of tax."). 
266. See David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with 
American Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 
120 (1993); Tassie Hanna, Sam Deloria & Charles E. Trimble, The Commission on State-Tribal 
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where tribes (and their members) and states each have legal, political, and 
monetary reasons to work around the other jurisdiction's rules and political 
prerogatives. 
However, tribal-state tax agreements are fluid and controversial. Consider 
the disputes between tribes and the State ofMichigan in the 1980s and 1990s 
leading up to the most important tax agreement of the 2000s. 267 The tribes 
hated paying state taxes on construction materials for tribal administration 
buildings going up on tribal lands that should have been tax exempt. 268 The 
State had its own serious allegations; most notably, that some of the tribes 
themselves had conspired with tribal members to do an end-around on valid 
state tax collection. 269 
This tribal-state tax agreement, now involving ten tribes in Michigan and 
the State of Michigan, demonstrates the give and take of a negotiated, arms-
length deal and also implicitly demonstrates the respect the parties have for 
each other. The agreement does away with the difficult jurisdictional 
problems of defining Indian country by identifying a negotiated "agreement 
area" for each tribe that serves as a new, clearly defined tribal territory for 
tax purposesY0 The tribes and the state agreed that tribal courts would be the 
primary arena of dispute resolution in the governance of the compacts. For 
example, if a state tax official has reason to believe there is contraband 
tobacco or motor fuel products in Indian country, the State must petition the 
tribal court for a search warrant. 271 If the State wants to force a taxpayer's 
compliance with an audit of a taxpayer in Indian country, it must seek a tribal 
order to do so. 272 
Most dramatically, if the State wants to enforce a taxpayer's compliance 
with the agreement where Indian country is in dispute, it must seek a tribal 
court order to do so.273 Further, if a tribal member taxpayer wishes to 
challenge the State's enforcement action and Indian country is in dispute, the 
Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 4 7 TuLSA L. REv. 553, 553 
(2012). 
267. See MICH. DEP'T OF TREASURY, State/Tribal Tax Agreements and Amendments, 
MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7 -238-43513 _ 43517---,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (listing the ten agreements); see also Tax Agreement between the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the State of Michigan, MICHIGAN.GOV (May 
27, 2004 ), available at http://www .michigan.gov/documents/G1BTaxAgreement_96417 _7 .pdf 
[hereinafter G1B Tax Agreement]. 
268. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan 
Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 17 (2004). 
269. !d. at 18-19. 
270. See G1B Tax Agreement, supra note 267, at§ II(A) app. A. 
271. See id. § XIII( C)( 4 )(b )(i). 
272. See id. § XIII(D)(6). 
273. See id. § XIII(D)(7). 
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State consents to tribal court jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. 274 The State 
also consents to allowing the tribal court to handle taxpayer appeals of a final 
State tax assessment or denial of a refund where Indian country is in 
dispute. 275 
In short, the State of Michigan takes Michigan's tribal courts seriously, 
following the lead of the Michigan Supreme Court. 276 The crux of the State 
of Michigan's willingness to rely upon Michigan tribal courts is Michigan 
Court Rule 2. 615. In the 1990s, several state and tribal judges met for several 
years, developed a good working relationship, and eventually recommended 
the court rule. 277 Rule 2.615 is a rule of reciprocal comity between tribal and 
state courts for the recognition of each other's court judgments, orders, and 
recordsY8 By the time the State and the tribes came together to negotiate a 
tax agreement, the Michigan court rule had been successful. The court rule 
is, in fact, built into the tax agreement. 279 
Other tribal and state courts are developing rules of comity and other 
relationships as well. Some of Minnesota's tribal courts and state courts, 
cabined by Public Law 280, which purports to extend state civil jurisdiction 
into Indian country,280 have been developing excellent relationships in 
sharing jurisdiction.281 
There are always outliers, however. Some local jurisdictions will never 
enter into a cooperative agreement with an Indian tribe, and some state 
leaders have unilaterally canceled omnibus tax agreements for political 
reasons. 282 Unfortunately, Supreme Court decisions tend to encourage 
political shenanigans. 283 There is much distrust on both sides and, in many 
274. See id. § XIII(D)(lO)(b). 
275. See id. § XIII(D)(l1). 
276. See Kathryn E. Fort, Waves of Education: Tribal-State Court Cooperation and the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 47 TuLSA L. REv. 529, 531 (2012). 
277. See James A. Bransky & Hon. Garfield W. Hood, The State/Tribal Forum: Moving 
Tribal and State Courts from Conflict to Cooperation, 72 MICH. B.J. 420 (May 1993); Hon. 
Michael F. Cavanagh, Michigan's Story: State and Tribal Courts Try to Do the Right Thing, 76 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999). 
278. See MICH. CT. RULE 2.615(a). 
279. See G1B Tax Agreement, supra note 267, at§ XIII(D)(4). 
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2014). 
281. See Hon. Korey Wahwassuck, The New Face of Justice: Joint Tribal-State Jurisdiction, 
47 WASHBURNL.J. 733 (2008); Hon. Korey Wahwassuck, Hon. John P. Smith & Hon. John R. 
Hawkinson, Building a Legacy of Hope: Perspectives on Joint Tribal-State Jurisdiction, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 859 (20 10). 
282. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 131 n.12 (2005) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In 1992, Kansas and the Nation negotiated an intergovermnental tax 
compact. ... When the initial five-year term expired, the State declined to renew the agreement.") 
283. See id. at 130-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is particularly troubling 
because of the cloud it casts over the most beneficial means to resolve conflicts of this order. ... 
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cases, racism. Border towns are notorious for hate crime incidents, 284 and 
local and tribal political leaders often cannot get past those concerns. 285 
All in all, however, the objective indicators are that tribal governance is 
improving, often dramatically. Tribes administer billions of federal dollars 
nationally, and many states and local governments have developed good-to-
excellent working relations with local tribal governments. Tribal justice 
systems are at the heart of this development. 
4. Changing Economic and Political Circumstances 
When the Supreme Court decided the first modern tribal jurisdiction cases 
involving nonmembers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, tribal economies 
were moribund. Now tribal gaming operations generate nearly $30 billion a 
year in revenue, tribal self-governance and self-determination compacts bring 
several billions more into Indian country, and tribal business corporations 
generate billions more through Section 8(a) minority contracting set-asides 
and other business operations, most notably resource extraction. These 
billions of dollars of economic activity generate many billions more in 
economic growth near Indian country. Thousands, if not hundreds of 
thousands, of nonmembers work for Indian tribes and tribal businesses; 
thousands of nonmember companies do extensive business with Indian tribes 
and tribal businesses; thousands more nonmembers live on tribal lands as 
lessees of tribal public housing, and many more benefit from tribal public 
safety services, utilities, and environmental regulation. 
The relationship goes both ways. Indian tribes are dependent on 
nonmembers as well. Tribes with demand for employees but a small tribal 
membership need nonmembers to fill both skilled and unskilled positions. 
Tribal and individual business interests need outside vendors and suppliers. 
The Supreme Court could not have known-no one did-how self-
determination and Indian gaming would change the economic and political 
landscape in and around Indian country in those early tribal civil jurisdiction 
cases. But it has. For example, two recent studies by the Oklahoma City 
University Agree Economic Research and Policy Institute showed that the 
By truncating the balancing-of-interests approach, the Court has diminished prospects for 
cooperative efforts to achieve resolution of taxation issues through constructive 
intergovernmental agreements."). 
284. See DEAN CHAVERS, RACISM IN INDIAN COUNTRY 52-60 (2009); BARBARA PERRY, 
SILENT VICTIMS: HATECRIMESAGAINSTNATIVEAMERICANS (2008); U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, 
THEFARMINGTONREPORT: CIVIL RIGHTS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 30YEARS LATER (2005). 
285. Cf LaVelle, Beating a Path of Retreat, supra note 65, at 544 (describing racial tensions 
in the events leading up to the Montana decision). 
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Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma's business activities contributed $1 billion to 
the state's economy,286 and that the Chickasaw Nation's economic activities 
contributed $2.4 billion to the state's economy. 287 The Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development established that American Indian 
incomes have risen three times faster than all other demographics since 1990; 
even non-gaming tribal incomes have increased 30 percent over the same 
period.288 Importantly, all this revenue feeds into the improving governance 
capacities of tribes discussed in II(A)(3). 
5. Lack of Federal and State Court Jurisdiction over Tribal Lands 
Finally, it is very possible that federal and state courts would not have 
jurisdiction over a civil claim arising on triballands. 289 Federal subject matter 
and diversity jurisdiction are not likely to be present, eliminating the federal 
courts as a forum to handle civil claims on tribal lands. While state courts are 
courts of general jurisdiction, subjective principles of federal Indian law 
complicate state court jurisdiction for cases arising on tribal lands. 
The Supreme Court long has recognized a significant limitation on the 
authority of states within Indian country, dating back to the 1830s, where the 
Court held that state law has "no force" in Indian country. 290 Of course, the 
Court retreated from that dramatic statement over the centuries, but as late as 
1959, the Court held that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question 
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."291 This statement, now 
known as the "infringement test," 292 now precludes states from taxing tribal 
286. See THE CHEROKEE NATION, CHEROKEE NATION 2010 ECONOMIC IMPACT (2010), 
available at 
http://www .cherokeephoenix.org/Docs/20 12/2/5984 _ CN%20Econornic%20Impact%20Report 
%20Book%20FINAL %202.7.12.pdf. 
287. See Oklahoma City University Study Reveals Substantial Economic Impact of the 
Chickasaw Nation on Oklahoma's Economy, Bus. WIRE (July 9, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://www .businesswire.com/news/home/20 120709006087 /en/Oklahoma-City -University-
Study-Reveals-Substantial-Economic. 
288. See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 264, at 8-9. 
289. E.g., Rodriguez v. Wong, 82 P.3d 263, 267-268 (Wash. App. 2004) (holding state court 
has no subject matter jurisdiction over employment dispute between tribe and nonmember on 
tribal lands). 
290. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,561 (1832). 
291. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1958). 
292. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 
32 AM. lNDIANL. REV. 391,416-19 (208). 
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property and reservation Indians and regulating on-reservation hunting and 
fishing. 293 
If, for example, the Supreme Court were for some reason to abandon or 
modify its Montana-Strate analysis in adjudicating tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers on tribal lands, it is possible that the starting point for a 
new line of analysis would be the federal Indian law preemption test and the 
accompanying infringement test. Professor Grant Christensen recently made 
the initial analysis on how the infringement test might apply to state court 
jurisdiction over a suit arising on triballands. 294 He argues that in cases where 
a nonmember trespasses on tribal lands, with the strong tribal sovereign 
prerogative that exists there, state courts would have no jurisdiction under the 
infringement test. 295 He is probably right, but more discussion is needed, 
especially if we are to include contract and tort claims involving nonmembers 
on tribal lands. For example, outside of the trespass to real property example, 
the Supreme Court has already said that Indian tribes are "strangers" to suit 
between two nonmembers. 296 The question remains-what interest does the 
tribe have in such a suit? The answer, perhaps, is not much. But then again, 
in a state court lawsuit arising on tribal lands, the state is also a stranger. 
Even so, contract, property, and tort laws develop in accordance with the 
common law and the legislative sanction of the people to which those laws 
apply. A tribe's interest in the development of the law that could apply within 
its territory goes beyond mere property rules. But how far it goes is subject 
to question. 
We now tum to the objections to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
B. Legal and Policy Objections to Tribal Jurisdiction 
Because the Supreme Court in the mid-1980s took policy objections to 
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers off the table, policy objections to 
tribal jurisdiction went underground, but remained salient. Studies such as a 
1970s work by the American Bar Foundation297 and the early 1990s report by 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights298 articulated numerous policy 
293. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993) (tax); New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983) (hunting and fishing). 
294. See Christenson, supra note 26, at 571-72. 
295. !d. ("Because sovereignty is inherently related to the land over which the sovereign can 
extend its authority and jurisdiction, trespass to real property is one of the strongest and most 
sacred areas of tribal court jurisdiction.") (footnote omitted). 
296. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,457 (1997). 
297. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE 
JUSTICE (1978). 
298. See U.S. COMM'NON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE lNDIANCIVILRIGHTS ACT (1991). 
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objections to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, though not in a 
comprehensive or organized fashion. Those studies focused far too much on 
anecdotal evidence. 
The most salient objections now have their ongms in the 
extraconstitutional character of tribal sovereigns. In other words, they are 
structural objections. 
1. Lack of American Constitutional Rights Protections 
There are two aspects to the structural opposition to tribal civil 
jurisdiction. In short, the Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes, 299 and 
therefore does not protect nonmembers, who are after all American citizens. 
The Supreme Court's most recent statements about tribal civil jurisdiction 
focus on the lack of American Constitutional protections for nonmembers. 300 
Justice Kennedy raised additional concerns in the context of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians that American citizens never 
"consent[ ed]" to the recognition by Congress of a third sovereign that would 
have prosecutorial power (i.e., Indian tribes). 301 
Since American law doesn't apply to limit tribal government excesses in 
civil cases, what law does apply is critical. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was 
very little tribal law for tribal courts to apply. 302 In 1968, Congress enacted 
the Indian Bill of Rights to correct this problem, citing the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on the lack of American civil rights protections in Indian 
country. 303 In 1987, the Supreme Court dismissed aspects of the structural 
concern by asserting that the Indian Bill ofRights "provides non-Indians with 
various protections against unfair treatment in the tribal courts."304 However, 
in 2008, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the view that the Indian Bill of 
Rights was sufficient, noting that "Indian courts 'differ from traditional 
American courts in a number of significant respects,"' undercutting whatever 
protections Congress could erect in Indian country for nonmembers. 305 
299. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
300. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 
(2008) (citing Talton). 
301. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
302. See NATI'L AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N., supra note 31, at 37-38. 
303. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2014) (Indian Bill of Rights); see Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Title II of the 
1968 Indian Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REV. 337, 340-44 (1969). 
304. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). 
305. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 
(2001) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
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Since at least 1968, Indian nations have been busy developing statutory 
and common law governance rules to effectively govern members and 
nonmembers. Tribes now enact statutes regulating gun control, 306 
environmental protection, 307 labor relations, 308 marriage equality, 309 tort 
claims,310 and a plethora of other statutes. 311 Tribal courts also have generated 
an impressive array of tribal common law, memorialized in thousands upon 
thousands ofwritten opinions. 312 
2. "Democratic deficit" 
Professor Alex Aleinikoffneatly articulated a second critical problem with 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers by noting a "democratic deficit" in tribal 
political processes. 313 As Aleinikoff noted, "large numbers of non-Indians 
live within reservation boundaries, yet they are not eligible for tribe 
membership and cannot vote in tribal elections, run for tribal office, or serve 
on tribal juries."314 Most concerning to observers is the application of 
traditional or customary law to "outsiders."315 
Ironically, though the Supreme Court eventually identified a federal 
common law right for nonmembers to be free of unjustified tribal authority, 
and established a federal common law cause of action to vindicate that 
right, 316 the Court eliminated from consideration the most important factors 
306. See Riley, supra note 10, at 1725-29. 
307. See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmenal Law, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 43, 63-96 (2014). 
308. See Wenona T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 487 (2008). 
309. See AnnE. Tweedy, Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Content, Theories & Process, 
46 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (abstract available at 
http:/ /ssm.corn!abstract=2377817). 
310. Cf Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal SelfDetermination in an Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 
3 98, 408-14 (2009) (detailing waivers of tribal immunity, including those in tribal tort claims 
statutes). 
311. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: 
Pragmatic Law and Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29 (2008). 
312. E.g., RAYMOND D. AUSTIN,NAVAJOCOURTSANDNAVAJOCOMMONLAW: A TRADITION 
OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009); Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in the Finding, 
Definition and Consideration of Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 319 
(2007-2008). 
313. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (2002). 
314. !d. 
315. Justice Souter first expounded on the problems of tribal law and "outsiders" in Nevada 
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 380-81 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
316. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 845 (1985). 
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for courts to consider when determining whether tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers is proper, factors like bias, judicial competence, and bad faith. 317 
The democratic deficit has numerous theoretical limitations. Chief among 
them is the reality that states routinely prosecute or discriminate American 
citizens of other states who had no say in the law under which they may be 
prosecuted. 318 For example, as of this writing, a same-sex couple may be 
entitled to all of the benefits of marriage under state law in Massachusetts, 
but not in Michigan. Under federalism principles, this is perfectly acceptable 
(of course, it is not under equal protection principles but that is another 
question). 
3. Independence of the Tribal Judiciary 
The lack of an impartial forum to adjudicate disputes has long been a 
concern in Indian country. 319 Tribal legislatures are often the source of 
authority for the creation of tribal courts, and therefore have the authority to 
repeal a tribal court ordinance or reverse a tribal court decision. 320 More and 
more tribal courts are independent as a matter of tribal constitutional law. But 
there remain horror stories of tribal councils removing tribal judges after a 
tribal court decision opposed the elected officials. The Supreme Court, 
quoting Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, asserted that "Tribal 
317. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 n. 12 (1987). 
318 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control over Indian Country, 53 
FED. LAw., March/ April2006, at 38, 40 ("The so-called democratic deficit problem is an illusion. 
To borrow an old analogy, a resident and citizen of Colorado who defaults on a loan in Utah may 
be subject to the legal processes of Utah, even though he or she is not a citizen of that state. The 
Court focuses on the possibility that the Colorado resident has legal status sufficient to some day 
acquire citizenship in Utah, in contrast to a non-Indian, who might not have that status. But at the 
time the Colorado citizen's loan is adjudicated, the person is not a citizen of Utah. Moreover, 
should the Colorado citizen move to Utah and become a citizen of Utah, the change in status could 
not alter the result of the Utah courts' adjudication of the loan at issue."). 
319. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATIIERS 68, 73-74 (1995). Contra Hon. Fred 
W. Gabourie, Judicial Independence ofTribal Courts, 44 ADVOC.: 0FFIC1ALPUBLICATIONIDAHO 
ST. B., Oct. 2001, at 24 ("Despite all the attention paid to the actions in Washington D.C., threats 
to judicial independence are actually more pronounced on the state and local levels.") (quoting 
Jerome J. Shertack, President's Message: The Risks to Judicial Independence, A.B.A. J., June 
1998, at 9). 
320. Cf Frederic Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal 
Court System, 38 UCLA L. REv. 991, 1006-07 (1991) (discussing tribal council efforts to assert 
authority over tribal judiciaries). 
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courts are often 'subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments,' 
and their legal methods may depend on 'unspoken practices and norms. "'321 
More and more tribes may have reached the best possible solution to the 
predicament, which is to professionalize the judiciary. As the late Dean 
Getches reported in 1978, most tribal judges in the early years were not 
lawyers. 322 More, though probably not most, tribal judges are lawyers with 
professional obligations that would insulate them from tribal political 
pressure. 323 It may still be true that most tribal lower court judges are not 
lawyers, but it is my experience that the vast majority of tribal appellate 
judges are lawyers (and many are law professors). Moreover, one 
commentator writing in the late 1990s studied numerous tribal court decisions 
involving tribal political branches and concluded that "the published cases 
would seem to indicate that tribal courts generally prevail in clashes with 
tribal councils over interpretation and enforcement of the [Indian Civil Rights 
Act] and triballaw."324 
I must interject my own personal experience as a tribal court appellate 
judge. I have presided over two judicial removal matters,325 and ruled several 
times against tribal government326-all without repercussions or the threat of 
repercussions from political branches of tribal government. 
321. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 334-35 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 
U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Duro). 
322. See NAT'LAMERICANINDIANCOURT JUDGES Ass'N., supra note 31, at 53. 
323. Not all tribal judges who are lawyers may agree with me. See, e.g., Hon. Jim Van 
Winkle, My Experience as a Tribal Court Judge, NEV. LAW. Aug. 19,2011, at 54, 54. 
324. Comm. for Better Tribal Gov't v. S. Ute Election Bd., 17 Indian L. Rep. 6095, 6095-96 
(S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1990); Chapoose v. Ute Indian Tribe, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6023, 6023 (Ute Tribal 
Ct. 1986); McCarthy, supra note 138, at493 (discussingMcKinneyv. Bus. Council, 20 IndianL. 
Rep. 6020, 6020 (Duck Valley Tribal Ct. 1993). 
325. See White v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, No. SC-12-01 (Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians Sup. Ct. 2013) (affirming $315,000 judgment against tribal govermnent for improperly 
removing tribal judge), available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 13/05/white-v-
poarch-band-of-creek-indians-iii.pdf; In re Judge John Kern, No. 2013-2331-CV-CV (Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Tribal Judiciary) (removing tribal judge in accordance 
with tribal judicial removal provision in tribal constitution). 
326. E.g., Jones v. Santee Sioux Tribal Council, No. AP13-01 (Santee Sioux Nation Sup. Ct. 
Dec. 13, 20 13), available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 13/05/l6dec20 13 -opinion-
13-0 1-jones-v-ssntc.pdf (rejecting tribal sovereign immunity defense to challenge to the removal 
of a sitting tribal council member); Rislingv. Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. A-14-001 (Hoopa Valley 
Tribal Ct. App. 2014), available at http:/!turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/order-
dismissing-appeal-fsc-ps-risling-v-hoopa.pdf (dismissing tribal interlocutory appeal); Turtle 
Mountain Judicial Bd. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, No. 04-007 (Turtle 
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians Tribal Ct. App. 2005), available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files. wordpress.com/20 13 /05/judicial-board -v -turtle-mountain-band.pdf (ruling 
against independent agency charged with regulating judicial branch). 
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4. Cultural Exceptionalism 
A fourth objection, one not directly addressed by the Supreme Court, is 
what I call cultural exceptionalism. Many non-Indians (and many Indians, as 
well) are under the impression that American Indians do not believe in private 
property327 or that Indian tribes are socialist governments328 and, as a result, 
that no mainstream American could ever assimilate Indian law. This 
perception has been raised in amicus briefs by legal defense foundations 
concerned about private property rights in Indian country. 329 The Mountain 
States Legal Foundation amicus brief in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long 
Family Land and Cattle Co.330 is the prototypical example. The Foundation, 
quoting extensively (and very selectively) from legal anthropologists Robert 
Cooter and Wolfgang F einkentscher, alleged that all tribal law is unwritten, 
oral, informal, and even called it the "underground" law of tribal courts. 331 
As I have argued elsewhere, tribal law based on custom and tradition is 
extremely unlikely to be applied to nonmembers without their consent. 332 
Tribal courts have no reason to apply traditional and customary law to 
nonmembers as that kind of law is almost universally inapplicable to issues 
involving nonmembers. 
5. Racial Exceptionalism 
A final objection is the elephant in the room-what I call racial 
exceptionalism, or simply racism. The Supreme Court does not say that 
327. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of 
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559, 1562 (2001). 
328. See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or 
Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REv. 757, 798 (2001). 
329. E.g., Brief for Am. Bankers Ass'n & S.D. Bankers Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Plains Commerce Bankv. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (No. 
07-411 ); Brief for Mountain States Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (No. 07-411); cf 
Brief for Citizens Equal Rights Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 535 U.S. 937 (2001) (No. 01-900) (arguing that 
nonmember property rights compel skepticism of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers). 
330. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
331. See Brief for Mountain States Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
supra note 329, at 7 8 (quoting Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: 
The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, Part I, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287 (1998); 
Robert D. Cooter and Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in 
American Indian Tribal Courts, Part II, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509 (1998)). 
332. See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common 
Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 701, 735 (2006); see also Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 27 ·· 
28, n.15, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (No. 
07-411) (applying my theory). 
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Indian tribes and their justice systems are racist and discriminate against both 
non-Indians and nonmember Indians from tribes disfavored by the home 
tribal court, but that argument is always hovering in the analysis. On the other 
hand, many tribal advocates accuse the Supreme Court and the federal and 
state courts of racism (too often to count). 333 
Consider the case of Red Wolf v. Burlington Northern Railroad.334 That 
case, initially decided in the Crow Tribal Court, involved a tribal member's 
wrongful death action against the nonmember railroad. In an amicus brief 
filed in the Strate case, 335 the railroad alleged that a tribal judge (not the 
presiding judge) addressed the all-Indian jury in the tribal language and 
encouraged the jury to punish the railroad for past actions.336 In the Strate oral 
argument, Justice O'Connor seemed inspired to ask a question about a 
hypothetical trial where a tribal court jury consists of "all the friends and 
relatives of the victim."337 I have suggested elsewhere that the invocation of 
the Red Wolf allegation was prejudicial to the chances of the tribal advocates 
in Strate, enough so that the Supreme Court ruled unanimously to affirm a 
lower court decision, 338 something it rarely does. If the Red Wolf story is true, 
then obviously the action was a serious breach of due process. 339 But it is odd 
333. E.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); Bethany R. Berger, 
Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REv. 1165, 1190 (noting 
"historic racism that supports Duro [v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)]"); Carole Goldberg, Critique 
by Comparison in Federal Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 719, 722 (2006) ("The characterization 
of Native peoples as savage hunters [in the Marshall Trilogy] was erroneous and racist. ... ") 
(footnote omitted); Singer, supra note 89, at 5 (arguing that many federal Indian law decisions 
"can be explained only by reference to perhaps unconscious racist assumptions about the nature 
and distribution of both property and power. This fact implies an uncomfortable truth: both 
property rights and political power in the United States are associated with a system of racial 
caste"); Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1751, 1756 (2003) ("[S]tereotypes and racism pervade most of the leading [federal Indian 
law] cases, even 'pro-Indian' opinions, so it can be difficult to determine the relative importance 
of legal principles, facts, and racist myth in determining an earlier case's outcome.") (footnote 
omitted). 
334. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 
U.S. 1110 (2000); Estates of Red Wolf & Bull Tail v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. 94-31 (Crow 
Ct. App.1996); see also Fletcher, Rebooting Indian Law in the Supreme Court, supra note 111, 
at 516 (discussing the case). 
3 3 5. Brief for the American Trucking Ass' ns. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 3, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872). 
336. See id. 
337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Strate, 520 U.S. 438. 
338. See Fletcher, Rebooting Indian Law in the Supreme Court, supra note 111, at 516. 
339. However, the case is likely an outlier. Bethany Berger's empirical study on Navajo cases 
involving nonmembers suggests that nonmembers often access tribal courts, even where the tribal 
court is extremely well-known for applying tribal common law and even invoking the Dine 
language in their opinions, is powerful evidence that the allegation about the Red Wolf case is 
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that the Supreme Court was willing to accept unci ted allegations of fact in a 
pending matter by an amicus. And it is unfortunate that the Court assumed 
that a flawed decision by one tribal court somehow infected the Fort Berthold 
tribal court when no such evidence existed. 
I now turn to my proposal for reforming federal common law on the 
question of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands. The 
Supreme Court's current dictate to the lower courts (and itself) on how to 
address tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is overly complex and 
confusing. And, despite my best efforts, I suspect that the public policy 
reasoning that flavors the federal common law on this question is just as 
confusing. I hope to bring principled and practical simplicity to the analysis. 
III. ADOPTING A FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS APPROACH FOR REVIEWING 
TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 
I first propose that the Supreme Court adopt the presumption it announced 
in dicta that tribal governments possess civil jurisdiction over nonmembers 
on tribal lands (excluding state officers and other exercises of tribal authority 
that invoke "an overriding national interest"340). Such a presumption is 
justified by the fact the Court has repeatedly recognized a presumption 
probably unusual. See Bethany Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); see also AUSTIN, supra note 56, at 62. 
340. Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 448 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) ("Tribal powers 
are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a 
divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the 
overriding interests of the National Government . ... ")(emphasis added); e.g., El Paso Natural 
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487 (1999) (holding federal statute preempted tribal court 
jurisdiction). 
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favoring tribal authority, 341 that tribal authority is at its apex on tribal lands, 342 
and for all the public policy reasons in Part II(A). Acknowledging this 
presumption would not end the inquiry federal and state courts to undertake 
in tribal jurisdiction cases. 
Second, I recommend allowing lower courts to make a collateral 
evidentiary record for the purpose of determining whether the tribe and/or 
tribal court provided adequate due process sufficient to guarantee that the 
exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over the nonmember was fundamentally 
fair. 343 This inquiry renders the initial presumption rebuttable. 
This involves lifting the Supreme Court's bar on lower courts from 
reviewing factors associated with tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, and 
perhaps borrowing from a mainstream doctrine of American law relating to 
the recognition of foreign judgments, orders, and records comity. Here 
(although I do elsewhere), I do not propose that federal courts simply allow 
tribes and tribal courts to regulate and adjudicate nonmembers at will, and 
wait for federal and state courts to apply a comity analysis when the 
prevailing party in tribal court seeks to enforce the judgment.344 
341. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,381 (2001) ("Tribal authority over the activities of 
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty .... Civil jurisdiction 
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific 
treaty provision or federal statute .... ")(quotations omitted); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 
U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (same); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) ("To be sure, Indian 
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."); see also Levy, supra note 154, at 
347 ("Nonetheless, within reservation boundaries a default presumption of civil and regulatory 
jurisdiction persisted; non-Indian conduct when it was not on non-Indian fee land was subject to 
both regulation by tribal authorities and civil jurisdiction in tribal courts."); cf Colville, 448 U.S. 
at 152 ("The widely held understanding within the Federal Govermnent has always been that 
federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power. Executive branch officials 
have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over 
the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant 
interest. ... "). 
342. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, 
the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled by them."). 
343. My recommendation would parallel, though not copy, Congress's admonition to tribal 
govermnents in the Tribal Law and Order Act, where Congress expanded tribal court sentencing 
authority but only if the tribal court provided certain due process rights to criminal defendants. 
See 25 U.S.C. § l302(c) (2014). In civil cases, the right to paid counsel is not necessary, but the 
requirements relating to the qualifications of the tribal judge and the availability of tribal law 
should be considered in civil cases, too. 
344. Comity in the enforcement of tribal judgments is not helpful here, most especially 
because the govermnental interests identified by the Supreme Court's "canonical" comity 
decision, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), are not sufficiently present in cases involving 
tribal judgments; cf Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 793 (2004) (describing Hilton as "canonical" and listing the interests as 
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Moreover, I do not attempt to revisit tribal civil jurisdiction on 
nonmember-controlled lands; instead, I leave that area solely to theMontana-
Strate analysis that has regulated the field for decades. I seek to focus on 
cases arising on Indian lands, cases the Supreme Court has not 
comprehensively decided and to which the Supreme Court itself has noted 
remains an open question. 
A. A New Inquiry into Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
The heart of the expanded review I recommend is due process, and I 
imagine it would be the heart of most federal and state court analyses of tribal 
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands. Originally, the Supreme 
Court articulated this exception to the tribal court exhaustion doctrine as 
"where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate 
opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction."345 I would read that 
language liberally, and allow nonmembers to directly challenge the tribe's 
civil authority over them on grounds that the tribe has not afforded the 
nonmember an "adequate opportunity" to defend themselves. Here, in my 
view, is where the due process challenges to tribal jurisdiction should arise. 
In the current state of the law, "futility" is the focus of the inquiry. 346 The 
lower courts have interpreted this exception to mean that the exhaustion 
requirement is excused if tribal court jurisdiction over the nonmember is not 
"colorable" or "plausible."347 
As I noted in Part I(D), the Supreme Court's decision announcing the tribal 
court exhaustion doctrine limited federal courts to examining whether the 
tribal court action against a nonmember was motivated by bad faith (or a 
desire to harass), or a lack of opportunity to challenge the court's 
jurisdiction.348 The Court, deferring to Congress's respect for tribal 
sovereignty, barred federal courts from looking to whether a tribal court is 
affected by local bias or is otherwise incompetent. 349 I propose allowing 
"the international system, the persons who are under the protection of American law, and the 
country that has issued the judgment"). 
345. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985). 
346. Cf Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 ("cause for immediate federal-court 
intervention"); id. at 449 n.7 ("exhaustion is not an unyielding requirement"). 
347. E.g., Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1024 (2009); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. 
Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 28 (lst Cir. 2000); Bank One, N.A. v. Lewis, 144 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 (S.D. 
Miss. 2001) (quoting Ninigret), ajJ'd, 281 F.3d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 818 (2002); 
Meyer & Assocs. Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 449 (La. 2008) (same). 
348. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (1985). 
349. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 1819 & n.12 (1987). 
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consideration of exactly those factors in order to determine whether a tribal 
government (especially a tribal court) may exercise jurisdiction over a 
nonmember for actions arising on tribal lands. It is clear from the cases that 
state and federal courts, now largely barred from examining these highly 
relevant factors, may make factual assumptions and assert presumptions 
about these factors without ever taking evidence on the specific action to 
determine whether these factors are present. Allowing limited federal court 
review of tribal court actions against nonmembers for disputes arising on 
tribal lands addresses the assumptions and presumptions about tribal 
authority over nonmembers. 
Consider what I think is the worst case scenario for both nonmembers and 
tribal advocates, the alleged facts of the Red Wolf v. Burlington Northern 
Railroad case before the Crow Tribal Court. 350 If we alter the facts a bit to 
make clear the case arose on tribal lands (the actual case arose on a railroad 
right of way within the reservation; in other words, not on triballands351), the 
federal court addressing the nonmember's challenge to tribal court 
jurisdiction could take evidence as to the alleged improprieties in tribal court: 
namely, that a tribal judge improperly influenced the jury, and that the tribal 
court violated the nonmember's due process rights by empaneling an all-
tribal member jury. Likely, if the nonmember proved those allegations true, 
then the federal court would be on exceptionally firm and non-theoretical 
ground in ruling the tribal court could not exercise jurisdiction over the 
nonmember. 
Let us examine prototypical cases involving exercises of tribal 
government authority over nonmembers that could fit into each category. 
Please note again that some of the cases below arose on non-tribal lands, and 
I have discussed the cases as if they arose on tribal lands. 
1. Bad Faith (Judicial Independence) 
Currently, federal courts may inquire as to whether a tribal court's 
assertion of civil jurisdiction over a nonmember is motivated by bad faith or 
a desire to harass the nonmember in order to excuse exhaustion of tribal 
remedies. I would expand the import of the inquiry to include tribal 
350. While I am persuaded that these fact patterns are extremely unusual, I must note that in 
a recent Florida case, the tribal court allegedly conducted child custody hearings involving a non-
Indian father in the tribal language. See Billie v. Stier, 141 So. 3d 584, at 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014 ). The state appellate court stripped the tribal court of jurisdiction over the matter. See id. at 
586-87. 
351. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F. 3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying 
the Strate analysis), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000). 
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government actions as well, including efforts to undermine the independence 
of the tribal judiciary. I would make good faith a requirement of jurisdiction 
over the nonmember. 
The first question, then, is to inquire into what the Supreme Court meant 
when it said it would allow federal courts to ask whether a tribal court's 
assertion of jurisdiction is motivated by bad faith. Occasionally, disputes 
between Indian tribes and nonmembers get ugly. Consider Dry Creek Lodge, 
Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes. 352 The case arose on the heavily 
checkerboarded and massive Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. 353 Dry 
Creek Lodge, a nonmember owned corporation, owned fee land within the 
reservation, with access to the main highway via a small road. 354 The Joint 
Business Council of the Northern Arapahoe and Eastern Shoshone Tribes, 
who share jurisdiction over the reservation, ordered the road closed, blocking 
the Dry Creek Lodge owners from exiting their land. 355 The tribal court judge 
refused to enjoin the tribal council's action, apparently alleging that the court 
would not wish to "incur the displeasure" of the counciP56 The tribal 
council's action in shutting off the nonmember's access to the main highway, 
effectively imprisoning the nonmembers on their own property, 357 is atypical 
of tribal government actions, but obviously not the only example. 358 
The Dry Creek Lodge facts are unusual, but there is a small body of federal 
common law developing that addresses this so-called "bad faith" exception 
to the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. One case recently decided by the Ninth 
Circuit, Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, L.L.C. v. 'Sa' NyuWa 
(Skywalk III), 359 addresses the bad faith exception. In Skywalk, the Hualapai 
Tribal Council purported to condemn the nonmember company's rights in the 
Grand Canyon Skywalk. 360 The tribal interests sought to exercise eminent 
352. 623 F.2d 682 (lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981). 
353. See id. at 683. 
354. See id. at 683 84. 
355. See id. at 684. 
356. !d. ("Thereafter the plaintiffs sought a remedy with the tribal court, but were refused 
access to it. The judge indicated he could not incur the displeasure of the Council and that consent 
of the Council would be needed."). 
357. See Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 319 
n.4 (lOth Cir. 1982) (describing the tribal council's action in Dry Creek Lodge as "particularly 
egregious allegations of personal restraint and deprivation of personal rights"). 
358. Also, there are due process issues associated with denying nonmember access to the 
tribal court and/or intimidating the tribal court judge. Moreover, Dry Creek Lodge was not a 
question of tribal jurisdiction over the nonmember, but a case finding no immunity from suit to 
enjoin the tribal council's action. See Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685. 
359. 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2013) (Skywalk III), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 825 (2013). 
360. See Grand Canyon SkywalkDev., L.L.C. v. 'Sa' NyuWa (Skywalk!)., No. CV12-8030-
PCT -DGC, at 1 (D. Ariz. 20 12), available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 12/02/dct-
order-2-28-12.pdf 
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domain under tribal law, and then adjudicate the just compensation due the 
nonmember in tribal court. 361 The district court in Skywalk held that the bad 
faith exception applied only to tribal court assertions of jurisdiction, not tribal 
government activities. 362 The Ninth Circuit agreed. 363 
However, assuming federal courts expand their scope of inquiry in 
accordance with my recommendations, the tribal government's actions in 
Skywalk would merit review. According to the nonmember pleadings, the 
Hualapai Tribal Council engaged in a systematic effort to largely drive the 
nonmember off the reservation and all but abandon its business operations on 
the reservation. 364 Specifically, the nonmember company alleged that the 
tribe hired a public relations firm to characterize the nonmember as an 
"unscrupulous businessman" that failed to complete the Skywalk's visitors' 
center. 365 The nonmember also alleged that the tribe intentionally interfered 
with its efforts to complete and operate the Skywalk. 366 The nonmember 
alleged that the tribe refused to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the 
contract. 367 The nonmember finally alleged that the tribe executed an order 
exercising eminent domain under tribal law and in tribal court, "set[ting] a 
valuation of $11 million without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing or any 
opportunity for GCSD to present evidence the allegations made by 
nonmember company."368 
In response, the Hualapai tribal business corporation ('Sa' NyuWa) denied 
the allegations relating to the tribal court eminent domain action. 369 The tribal 
361. Cf Memorandum from Glen Hallman et al. to Hualapai Tribal Council 3-4 (Feb. 11, 
2011) (analyzing a possible just compensation argument in tribal court), reprinted in Docket No. 
37-1, at 14, 16-17; Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., L.L.C. v. 'Sa' NyuWa, No. CV12-8030-PCT-
DGC (D. Ariz. 2012), available at http:/!turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/gcs-exhibits-pt-
l.pdf. 
362. See Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. (Skywalk II), No. CV12-8030-PCT-DGC at 3 8 (D. 
Ariz. 20 12), available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 12/03/dct -order-3-19-12.pdf. 
363. See Skywalk III, 715 F.3d at 1201 03. In a related proceeding, an arbitrator confirmed 
the Skywalk developer's version of the story, and awarded the developer more than $28 million 
in damages, attorney fees, and costs. See In re Arbitration of Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., L.L.C. 
v. 'Sa' NyuWa, Inc., No. 76 517 Y 00191 11 S1M (Am. Arbitration Ass'n. Comm. Panel, Aug. 
16, 20 12), available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 12/08/419831135 _ v-
1 _finalaward-120816.pdf. 
364. See generally Supplemental Brief in Support of Bad FaithException-Pursuantto Court 
Order [32], Skywalk II, CV12-8030-PCT-DGC, available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files. wordpress.com/20 12/03 I gcs-bad-faith-brief. pdf. 
365. !d. at 5. 
366. See id. at 5 6. 
367. See id. at 6. 
368. !d. at 7. 
369. See Defendants' Supplement to Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
Re "Bad Faith" Exception to Exhaustion Requirement, at 6 10, Skywalk II, No. CV12-8030-PCT-
DGC, available at http:/ /turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 12/03/hualapai -bad-faith-brief.pdf. 
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defendants alleged that their exercise of eminent domain was authorized as a 
legislative function of the tribal government, and was presumptively valid if 
exercised for a public purpose. 370 The tribal defendants also alleged that the 
nonmember knew from the outset that eminent domain was a possibility 
because the "Hualapai Constitution, which was approved by the federal 
government, authorizes the taking of property subject to payment of just 
compensation, and the [contract] contained detailed provisions in the case of 
condemnation by 'any competent authority. "'371 The tribal defendants also 
argued that the nonmember would have the opportunity to obtain just 
compensation in tribal court. 372 In general, the tribal defendants argued that 
the nonmember's claims of a secret conspiracy were merely trumped up 
contract claims. 373 
The Skywalk facts, while unusually sensational, are exactly the kind of 
facts that federal and state courts could and should use to determine whether 
an exercise of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on Indian lands is valid. 
Instead, the lower court reviewed only the actions of the Hualapai tribal court 
judges in completing its bad faith inquiry, and even then the import was only 
that the nonmember would be forced to exhaust tribal remedies. 374 What a 
wasted and misguided effort! 
A final note on tribal judicial independence: a federal or state court's 
inquiry into the due process questions relating to the independence of the 
tribal judiciary from improper tribal political influence is difficult, though 
probably no more so than such an inquiry is in state and federal courts. 375 A 
major theme in this paper is a rejection of making broad assumptions and 
presumptions about tribal governments and tribal courts, and instead seeking 
specific evidence about the workings of the tribal government in question. 
Inquiries into tribal judicial independence will not be easy-if a tribal judge, 
under pressure from tribal leaders, railroads a nonmember in tribal court, that 
tribal judge is unlikely to confirm improper influence in federal or state 
court.376 Even so, extraneous evidence confirming sufficient judicial 
370. See id. at 6. 
371. !d. at 7. 
372. See id. 
373. See id. at 7 10. 
374. See Skywalk III, 715 F.3d 1196, 1201 03 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 825 
(2013). 
375. Cf Hon. Gerald A. Rosen, Judicial Independence in an Age of Political and Media 
Scrutiny, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 685, 687 88 (1997) (discussing U.S v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 
232 (S.D. N.Y. 1996), a case where a federal district court judge reversed his own ruling after 
political pressure from President Clinton and Sen. Dole). 
376. That said, tribal judges have gone on record over the years to condemn improper actions 
by tribal leaders. E.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 298, at III-15 to III-32 
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independence probably can be located and extracted, most notably in the prior 
opinions of the tribal court that go against the tribal government. 
2. American Constitutional Rights Protections 
Consider the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Kroner v. Oneida 
Seven Generations Corporation. 377 That case arose on tribal lands and 
involved a nonmember tribal employee who alleged the tribal corporation 
unlawfully fired him; he alleged tort and contract claims in state court.378 The 
legal issue in Kroner was whether the Wisconsin state court can (and should) 
transfer such a case to tribal court under a special state law providing for the 
transfer. 379 The Wisconsin rule has been hotly debated in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court. 380 The rule derives from negotiations following that court's 
decision in Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 381 which required tribal and state court judges to confer for the 
purposes of determining jurisdiction in Wisconsin (which may assert civil 
jurisdiction over Indian country actions) in order to avoid a race to judgment 
and inconsistent results. 382 The Wisconsin Supreme Court narrowly approved 
the resulting protocol, sometimes known as the Teague protocol, over a 
vigorous dissent. 383 
In the Kroner case, as a prerequisite to consideration by the state court to 
transfer the case, the court remanded the case back to the lower court to make 
determinations about whether the tribal court had jurisdiction.384 
Unfortunately, the state court had granted the transfer to the Wisconsin 
(collecting tribal judge conunents on weaknesses in separation of powers between elected 
officials and tribal judges). 
377. 819 N.W.2d 264 (Wis. 2012). 
378. See id. at 265 (Crooks, J.). 
379. See id. (Crooks, J.) (citing Wrs. STAT. § 801.54, which authorizes "the circuit court, in 
its discretion, to transfer [an] action to the tribal court"). 
380. See Wise. Sup. Ct. Order No. 07-11B, In re Review of Wis. Stat.§ 801.54, discretionary 
transfer of cases to tribal court, 2011 WI 53 (2011), available at 
http:/ /turtletalk.files. wordpress.com/20 11/0717-11 b. pdf [hereinafter Order No. 07 -1lB ]. 
381. 612 N.W.2d 709 (Wis. 2000). 
382. !d. at 718. 
383. See Order No. 07-11B, supra note 380. The dissent wrote that "[s]eparation of church 
and state is one of the basic tenets of our democracy. However, tribal courts do not separate church 
and state; instead, tribal courts impose their religious values as custom and tradition that informs 
the tribal courts' view of the law." !d. at~ 11 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (citing Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 2 (July 24, 
2008) (statement of Roman J. Duran, Vice President, National American Indian Court Judges 
Association)). 
384. See Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 819 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Wis. 2012) 
(Crooks, J.). 
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Oneida tribal court two years after Kroner sued in state court and without 
making proper factual findings. 385 Moreover, Kroner had filed his claim 
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved the Teague protocol.386 
Setting those facts aside, at bottom, Kroner alleged that he had an expectation 
of continued employment (he was the ChiefExecutive Officer of the tribally-
owned federal corporation, Oneida Seven Generations Corporation). 387 The 
tribe argued he was an at-will employee. 388 
Once again, Justice Roggensack (the Teague protocol dissenter) restated 
her objections to the tribal court transfer rule. She argued that, as the Supreme 
Court held, American (and state) constitutional protections do not apply in 
tribal court. 389 She repeated her objection to tribal incorporation of tribal 
religion into court decision-making. 390 She also noted that the lack of direct 
appellate review by Wisconsin courts of tribal court decisions was a 
"significant deprivation of a substantive right for Wisconsin litigants."391 
Of these three serious objections, at least two of the objections can be 
resolved under my recommendation to allow federal and state courts to make 
an independent determination whether the tribal government (or court) 
provided adequate due process to the nonmember. The third, access to 
Wisconsin courts, becomes less important if the first two are addressed. 392 
Luckily, many of the decisions reached by the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin's 
tribal courts are available on Westlaw and Versuslaw. To address the most 
serious allegation-that tribal courts insert religious views into the 
decisions393-----one could argue that no Wisconsin Oneida court has done so. 
385. See id. at28l-82 (Roggensack, J., concurring). 
386. See id. at 283. 
387. See id. at 281. 
388. See id.. 
389. See id. at 284 ("However, as the United States Supreme Court has held, the United States 
Constitution is not binding on tribal courts .... As separate sovereigns antedating the Constitution, 
Indian tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those [federal] constitutional 
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.") (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
390. See id. at 285 ("Separation of church and state is one of the basic tenets of our 
democracy; however, separation of church and state is not a tenet of all tribes. Instead, tribal 
courts may incorporate their religious values as custom and tradition that inform tribal courts' 
views of the law.") (citing Duran, supra note 383). 
391. !d. 
392. Nonmembers in non-Public Law 280 states would not have a reasonable expectation of 
a right to access state or federal courts anyway. See generally Rodriguez v. Wong, 82 P.3d 263, 
267 (Wash. App. 2004). 
393. Cf Levy, supra note 154, at 359 ("It is true that nonbelievers have a right not to be 
sanctioned by religious courts, but religious courts in the United States are not allowed to impose 
criminal punishments on anyone. The only punishments at their disposal are intra-religious, e.g., 
excommunication."). 
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The words "religion" or "religious" appear only in two Oneida cases, Oneida 
Personnel Commission v. Danforth,394 and Spaulding v. Schroeder. 395 In 
Danforth, a case involving the removal of a tribal member from membership 
on the Oneida Personnel Commission and which involved free speech 
issues, 396 "religion" appears as a quote from the Indian Civil Rights Act. 397 In 
Spaulding, a suit to stop the showing a movie to a tribal government 
department because it allegedly offended the religious sensibilities of the 
plaintiff, 398 the court cited to the Oneida Constitution, which guarantees the 
freedom of religion. 399 Perhaps the nonmember in Kroner could have 
demonstrated that tribal religious views do penetrate tribal court decision-
making in less obvious ways, or even insidious ways, but it seems unlikely 
to do so in a simple employment separation case. 400 
A court could enter into a second line of inquiries about the constitutional 
protections afforded to nonmembers and others in the Oneida judicial system. 
The Oneida Constitution provides for individual rights protections, as noted 
in the Spaulding case: 
All members of the Tribe shall be accorded equal opportunities to 
participate in the economic resources and activities of the tribe. All 
members of the tribe may enjoy, without hindrance, freedom of 
worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly, association and due 
process of law, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States.401 
Moreover, the Oneida courts have interpreted that tribal constitutional 
provision, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 402 in several cases. Orie v. Oneida 
Nation Tribal School Board,403 the court held that a former employee's 
394. No. 98-CVL-0010, 1999 WL 35010342 (Oneida Tribal Jud. System Mar. 22, 1999). 
395. No. 10-TC-030, 2010 WL 7746041 (Oneida Tribal Jud. System Mar. 16, 2010). 
396. See 1999 WL 35010342, at *l. 
397. See id. at *9 n.6 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(l)). 
398. See 2010 WL 7746041, at *l. 
399. See id. at *1 ( "All members of the Tribe shall be accorded equal opportunities to 
participate in the economic resources and activities of the tribe. All members of the tribe may 
enjoy, without hindrance, freedom of worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly, association 
and due process of law, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.")( quoting ONEIDA 
TRIBE OF WIS. CONST. art. VI). 
400. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law 
Enigma. Tribal Governance Paradox. and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
273 (2005) (summarizing and discussing dozens of tribal court cases involving allegations of 
wrongful discharge, none involving allegations that a tribal court improperly decided a matter 
based on religious preferences). 
401. ONEIDA TRIBE OF WIS. CONST. art. Vl. 
402. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 ( 2014). 
403. No. 96-EP-0007, 1997 WL 34713022 (Oneida Ct. App. July 31, 1997). 
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release of claims against tribal school board in exchange for a settlement may 
violate her "Constitutional rights," and held the release invalid. 404 The 
plaintiff in Orie had previously won to vindicate her civil rights in Orie v. 
Gollnick. 405 Consider also Teller v. Oneida Housing Authority,406 where the 
court held that a tenant, not a party to a tribal housing lease, has standing to 
sue to challenge eviction by the tribal housing authority. 407 
In short, tribal constitutional rights as guaranteed by the tribal constitution 
and tribal courts are robust. Whether they are inferior to American or state 
constitutional rights is a determination that could be made by a federal or 
state court, something courts already do in deciding whether to grant comity 
to foreign judgments. 
3. Democratic Deficit 
Nonmembers usually are outsiders in the making and operation of tribal 
law, giving rise to the "democratic deficit." The democratic deficit is 
structural, in that nonmembers usually cannot vote in elections or serve as 
elected officials that make law (although many nonmembers serve as tribal 
court judges). The democratic deficit is also actual, in that tribes may subject 
nonmembers to legal rules to which nonmembers are unaware or unable to 
understand. My recommendation to allow federal and state judges the 
opportunity to inquire about how the democratic deficit may prejudice 
nonmembers in a particular case would alleviate these concerns. 
Consider the Supreme Court's most recent tribal civil jurisdiction case, 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.408 In that case, 
tribal members sued a nonmember bank to avoid foreclosure on a mortgage, 
and to allege various contract and tort claims against the nonmember that 
included allegations of discrimination. 409 A tribal jury found for the tribal 
members, and awarded damages. 410 The plaintiffs brought three successful 
causes of action, one of which was a race discrimination claim based on tribal 
tort law. 411 
404. !d. at *2. 
405. No. 96-EP-0007, 1997 WL 34713018 (Oneida Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1997). 
406. No. 01-AC-015, 2002 WL 34527414 (Oneida Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2000). 
407. See id. at *3. 
408. 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
409. See id. at 322. 
410. See id. at 323. 
411. See id. at 343 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("As the basis for their discrimination claim, the 
Longs essentially asserted that the Bank offered them terms and conditions on land-financing 
transactions less favorable than the terms and conditions offered to non-Indians. Although the 
Tribal Court could not reinstate the Longs as owners of the ranch lands that had been in their 
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The analysis not undertaken at all by the Supreme Court in Plains 
Commerce was whether the application of the tribal law by a tribal jury was 
abhorrent to the due process expectations of American citizens in the United 
States. The Eighth Circuit did, however, engage in that analysis at the behest 
of the nonmember bank.412 Specifically, the nonmember argued that the 
application of the tribal tort of discrimination was a violation of due 
process. 413 This argument is exactly the kind of argument I would argue 
should be a part of federal and state court analyses of tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers. 
The Eighth Circuit rejected the nonmember's due process claims, holding 
first that the nonmember bank had adequate notice of the tort at issue: both 
parties in the tribal court, as well as the tribal court itself, treated the tribal 
tort claim as analogous to a federal tort claim, a tort to which the nonmember 
could defend without surprise. 414 The court also rejected the nonmember's 
claim that "it could not obtain a fair hearing in tribal court on a claim that it 
discriminated against Indians."415 The nonmember presented no evidence of 
a lack of fairness in the tribal court, and the court noted further that the 
nonmember chose not to invoke its right under tribal law to demand a jury 
that included both members and nonmembers. 416 Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court's common law doctrine on tribal civil jurisdiction makes this analysis 
irrelevant. 417 
The structural aspect of the democratic deficit is a difficult one. 
Nonmembers may sit on a tribal court jury, but they are unlikely to have the 
right to participate in the tribal legislative process in a meaningful way. The 
facts in Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 418 a case involving the effort of a 
tribal government to regulate nonmember lands within its reservation 
family for decades, that court could hold the Bank answerable in damages, the law's traditional 
remedy for the tortious injury the Longs experienced.") 
412. See Plains Commerce Bankv. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 491 F. 3d 878, 890 
92 (8th Cir. 2007), rev 'd, 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
413. See id. at 890. 
414. Seeid. at891-92. 
415. !d. at 892. 
416. See id. 
417. Ironically, the Supreme Court's decision in Plains Commerce Bank striking the jury 
verdict on the discrimination claim (the only claim appealed by the nonmember) kept the 
remaining claims in place. And since the verdict was a general verdict, the damages award and 
the injunction against the nonmember remain in place to this day. A federal court has sent the 
matter back to the tribal court for resolution. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle Co., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. S.D. 2012). 
418. 5 NICS App. 37 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 1998); see also Schlosser, supra note 
33, at 598-601 (analyzing the case). 
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boundaries in order to preserve sacred sites, 419 exemplify the best possible 
scenario for involving nonmember participation in the tribal legislative 
process. Even that might not be enough to make a federal or state court 
comfortable about the exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over a nonmember 
property owner. 
In Bugenig, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council sought to protect certain 
sacred sites within its reservation by creating buffer zones around the sites 
and prohibiting development (especially timber cutting) within the buffer 
zones. 420 The buffer zones affected the nonmember's property, and so before 
the tribe instituted the plan, it formally notified the nonmember landowners 
and sought their input. 421 The tribe conducted two public meetings as well, 
and again provided formal notice to the nonmember landowners when the 
tribe finalized the buffer zone regulation. 422 While ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the Hoopa Valley Tribe's authority over the nonmember, 423 
the court never engaged in analysis of the tribe's efforts to involve 
nonmembers in its decision-making process, nor could it under the current 
regime. 
B. Addressing the Strate Problem 
I intend this proposal to apply only on tribal lands, and that excludes a 
broad number of cases and disputes. I do so because federal Indian law reform 
should be incremental. Frankly, it is not palatable to argue for dramatic 
common law reform when the federal judiciary has decided so many cases 
using the Montana-Strate analysis. Since the Supreme Court has yet to 
engage in a case involving tribal civil jurisdiction over disputes arising on 
tribal lands, there is room here for persuasion. 
As such, while this may be too preliminary, the next step is to seek 
reconsideration of the Indian lands analysis in Strate v. A-1 Contractors. 424 
Strate involved an auto accident on tribal trust lands upon which the State of 
North Dakota retained a right-of-way for a highway. 425 The Court concluded 
that Montana's general rule applied because the tribe's granting of the 
419. See Bugenig, 5 NICS App. at 38-40 (describing aspects of the Hupa religion and the 
importance of its sacred sites). 
420. See id. at 43. 
421. See id. 
422. See id. at 44. 
423. See Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002). 
424. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
425. See id. at 442-43. 
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easement meant the lands were no longer under tribal control or federal 
superintendency. 426 
There are two aspects to this holding that merit mention. First, as a matter 
of federal Indian law, this decision makes perfect sense. 427 The state 
maintained and patrolled the road, the tribe received payment for the 
easement, and there was plenty of precedent for the holding. Second, as a 
matter of reservation governance, the decision makes no sense. As a result of 
Strate, there are narrow, winding corridors of state court jurisdiction speckled 
throughout reservations with high tribal landownership. 
Case in point is the recent decision in EXC, Inc. v. Jensen (EXC I/). 428 
There, the Navajo Supreme Court had ruled that Navajo courts had 
jurisdiction over an auto accident on a state controlled highway within the 
Navajo Nation. 429 The federal district court properly followed Strate, and held 
that Navajo courts did not retain jurisdiction over the nonmember tour bus 
owner that allegedly killed a Navajo man through its negligence. 430 But the 
Navajo Nation presents a special case. The Navajo reservation is the largest 
reservation in the United States, and nearly all of the land on the reservation 
is tribal land and nearly all of the people living there are Navajos or 
nonmember Indians. The closest state court is Apache County Superior 
Court, located in St. Johns, Arizona, about 200 miles away from the Kayenta 
District Court, much closer to the site of the accident. Requiring Navajo 
plaintiffs and witnesses to travel by two-lane blacktop to the state court in 
order to seek a remedy for a tragic death is harsh, to say the least. 
Consider also that the Navajo Nation judiciary is the most respected, well-
known, and analyzed tribal judiciary in the nation. 431 This is the same court 
that the Supreme Court held had exclusive jurisdiction over a civil suit against 
tribal members arising in Indian country in 1959.432 The judiciary and the 
Navajo legislature have for decades engaged in institution building that 
426. See id. at 455-56. 
427. Cf Carpenter, supra note 8, at 1093 ("An 'express easement' is an interest in land, 
granted in writing, signed by the grantor, that delineates the purposes and conditions under which 
a nonowner may use an owner's property."). 
428. No. CV 10-08197-PCT-JAT, 2012 WL 3264526, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012), 
appeal pending. 
429. See EXC, Inc. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct. (EXC I), 9 Am. Tribal Law 176, 178 (Navajo Nation 
Sup. Ct. 2010). 
430. See EXC II, 2012 WL 3264526, at *4. 
431. For a sampling of important scholarship remarking on the Navajo judiciary and its 
deeply theorized common law, see, for example, AUSTIN, supra note 56; Berger, supra note 331. 
432. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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directly involves nonmembers, so much so that even realists about tribal 
sovereignty give the Nation their respect. 433 
The Navajo Nation judiciary, unlike the federal district court, may engage 
in the type of analysis I propose. In EXC I, the Court addressed the questions 
raised as to the structural fairness of applying Navajo law to nonmembers: 
"Fully cognizant of the complexity of the legal environment and rising to the 
burdens of responsible government, the Navajo Nation has safeguards in 
place to afford due process to all individuals subject to our jurisdiction."434 
Regardless of whether these representations would be persuasive on a federal 
court, none of this is relevant in the Montana-Strate line of cases. 
Assuming, however, that the courts move in a direction similar to the one 
I propose here in cases challenging tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers 
on tribal lands, the next step might be a reconsideration of the application of 
Montana on state highways as in EXC. 
IV. CONCLUSION-OPTING IN AND EARNING SOVEREIGNTY 
My recommendations may find no takers. Institutional economics teaches 
us that it is far easier to travel the road already laid out before us than to go 
against the grain. 435 Many, though not all, of the outcomes state and federal 
courts reach in relation to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers trouble 
me. And while outcomes matter, the law must still be followed. So perhaps 
the Montana-Strate analysis will prevail even on tribal lands. 
Common law ages and develops based on changes in the realities of the 
world. The change is slow, it is true, but Indian tribes are timeless entities. 
And while I primarily speak to my colleagues on the federal and state benches 
that hear so many tribal jurisdiction cases, I also speak to tribal leaders and 
tribal advocates. 
To those tribal people, I would say that federal Indian law and the tribal 
advocates who have fought for it have created a space for tribal governance 
to grow and restore itself The recent trend in Congressional thinking on tribal 
433. See, e.g., Email from Lynn Slade, to Matthew L.M. Fletcher (Aug. 15, 2012) (on file 
with author) ("Of course, Navajo is a leader in using consent and institutional development to 
strengthen tribal government and authorities, providing for nonmembers on tribal court juries and 
requiring consent to tribal law and courts as (generally) a condition of leasing or contracting with 
the Nation. Of course they largely succeed in the latter effort because they've done hard work on 
institutions."). 
434. EXC I, 9 Am. Tribal Law at 190; see also Krakoff, supra note 26, at 1154 ("Our concept 
of 'Naleeh' is more generous than due process.") (quoting Raymond Etcitty). 
435. Cf Wenona T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 487 (showing that nonmember unions in Indian country still prefer federal law 
over tribal law, even though tribal law may be more protective of labor). 
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authority is to recognize and reaffirm tribal authority to exercise expanded 
governmental authority only if the tribe meets or exceeds American 
constitutional standards. 436 Many tribal leaders and advocates may say, 
rightly, that they do not want or need authority over nonmembers, or that they 
will refuse to assimilate their legal culture in the manner demanded by 
outsiders. That is the essence of tribal sovereignty, but tribal leaders and 
advocates should seriously consider opting-in if they want authority to 
regulate and adjudicate nonmembers on their lands. If nonmembers are of no 
concern to tribal leaders, then I suppose there is no cause to listen. 
Finally, tribal sovereignty-as tribal leaders frequently say-is not given 
to tribes by the federal government. Where I part ways with some tribal 
leaders is in the retention of tribal sovereignty. It is true that tribal governance 
authority exists because it predates the Constitution and the American 
Republic and has never been entirely extinguished, but expansive tribal 
authority must be earned. 437 
Many tribes now are earning the right to govern, even over nonmembers, 
and even if the courts are slow to recognize that right. Part of the diligent 
work that tribes must do in earning the right to govern nonmembers is 
persuading the superior sovereign that tribes can do so in fundamentally fair 
ways. Expanding federal and state court inquiries into whether a tribal 
government or tribal court guaranteed a fundamentally fair governance 
process over nonmembers helps that process along. Developing and 
modernizing tribal institutions does much, much more. 
Miigwetch. 
436. See Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, Title II, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2279, 
(2010) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b) (d) (2014)) (enhancing tribal sentencing authority); 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, Title IX, § 904, 127 
Stat. 120 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304) (tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian 
domestic violence perpetrators). 
437. Cf Krakoff, supra note 26, at 1191 (recommending the building and strengthening of 
tribal sovereignty "from within"). 
*** 
